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Currently, some 2.4 billion people in developing countries lack modern fuels for cooking 
and heating and 1.6 billion have, even one century after the invention of the tube light, 
no access to electricity.1 
In spite of the fact that electricity supplies have been extended to more than 1.3 billion 
people in developing countries over the last 25 years, most of these connections have 
been in urban areas. Indeed, four out of five people without access to electricity live in 
rural areas in the developing world.2 Due to an expected growth of the total population 
in developing countries of more than three billion in less than four decades, the prob-
lems of rural energy are likely to become more pressing than ever.3 
 
Programmes for rural electrification, as the most prominent approach to rural energy 
development, are commonly embedded into rural development policies of developing 
countries. As in most cases national power utilities are entrusted with the task of rural 
electrification, these programmes are most often designed as centralised grid extension 
programmes. These are, however, expensive and, due to scattered villages in rural ar-
eas, do not always represent the least-cost solution for electrification. 
Therefore decentralised electricity and generation through diesel generators or renew-
able energy (RE) can often be considered as more appropriate and cost-effective.4 In 
comparison to fossil fuels, RE has significant environmental advantages and, notewor-
thy, the costs of many renewable technologies have come down significantly in the last 
decade.5 Finally, many renewable energy appliances are small in scale and are there-
fore manageable for rural communities. 
The key to success to these decentralised mini grids is the local institutional arrange-
ment on who invests, develops, owns and operates the systems. For their ownership and 
management three different business models are possible:6 
Public utilities are the most common model for rural electrification in developing coun-
tries and many of these companies provide mini grid services. The main advantages of 
this approach are the technical capabilities and financial resources of the utility com-
panies and the easier possibility for the government to implement subsidy mechanisms. 
However, there are several disadvantages of the utility model for RE mini grid systems: 
First, due to the remoteness and the relatively low revenue generation, these systems 
are a low priority for the utility, often resulting in little attention to system mainte-
nance and repair and therefore in a deterioration of the system reliability over time. 
Another disadvantage is that public utilities in many developing countries are often in-
efficient and driven by political agendas.7 
Rural mini grid systems developed, owned and operated by the private sector have the 
advantage that, compared to public utilities, some of the political interferences can be 
                                               
1 UNESCAP 2005: 1; 
2 Saghir 2005: 9. 
3 World Bank 2004: 5. 
4 Meier 2001: 31f. 
5 World Bank 2004: 5. 
6 Additionally a fourth ‚hybrid model’, namely the combination of above three models is possible (World 
Bank 2006). 
7 World Bank 2006. 
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eliminated. But despite the encouragement of private investment in the electricity in-
dustry, private companies have in most cases so far shown little interest in investing in 
rural areas, but instead preferred to concentrate on supplying industrial and urban cus-
tomers.1 A further limitation is the fact that private energy entrepreneurs are usually 
small and have only limited technical skills.1 
The most common business model for developing renewable energy mini grid systems is 
community-based organisations.2 Regarding the electrified village, such a community-
managed project requires collective action – “voluntary action taken by a group to 
achieve common goals.”3 However, in contrast to a state-owned or private solution, 
electricity generated in that way has characteristics of common-pool resources (CPRs), 
whose utilisation would, according to Hardin’s (1968) thesis, in the long term result in a 
“tragedy” due to over-exploitation by the users. 
 
An example of a decentralised rural electrification project with community-managed 
electricity generation is the micro hydel4 programme of the Aga Khan Rural Support 
Programme (AKRSP) in Chitral, the mountainous northernmost district of the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan.  
On the one hand the success of this non-governmental organisation’s micro hydel pro-
gramme has been widely recognised: In 2004 AKRSP received the Ashden Award for Sus-
tainable Energy5 and in 2005 it was awarded with the Global Development Award for the 
most Innovative Development Project by the Global Development Network.6  
On the other hand, however, there are concerns about the sustainability7 of the micro 
hydels: These are expressed in an evaluation by the European Commission (EC) of 
AKRSP’s infrastructure programme, which says that the “maintenance capacity might 
have increased, but remains relatively poor for certain types of infrastructure, such as 
[…] micro-hydels.”8 Furthermore, the Operations Evaluations Department (OED) of the 
World Bank states that for other infrastructure projects the “Sustainability is likely, but 
microhydels have some potential problems.”9 The arguments concentrate on lacking 
financial reserves of the communities; a representative and deeper research for further 
factors has not yet taken place. 
 
In order to answer the question, what factors influence or even imperil the sustainabil-
ity of community-managed micro hydels and to what extent Hardin’s thesis applies to 
these projects, a three month research internship with AKRSP in Pakistan was carried 
out. One month was spent in its headquarters in Gilgit, in the Northern Areas, for the 
collection of secondary data, and two months in the Regional Office in Chitral. Thence 
                                               
1 World Bank 2004: 9. 
2 World Bank 2006. 
3 Meinzen-Dick & Di Gregorio 2004: 1. 
4 A micro hydel is hydro power installation with an electrical capacity of up to 100 kW. 
5 The Ashden Award promotes inspirational renewable energy projects for providing social and economic 
benefit to local communities and is handed over by Prince Charles (Ashden Awards 2006). 
6 The Global Development Award competition is the largest international contest for researchers on devel-
opment (GDN 2006). 
7 At this point of time we can consider a micro hydel as ‘sustainable’, if it has got a high probability of 
smooth functionality until the end of its lifetime. For a more precise definition of ‘sustainability’ in the 
context of community-managed micro hydels refer to Section 3.3.  
8 EC 2003: 38. 
9 World Bank 2002: 29. 
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27 micro hydel projects were visited and interviews with persons involved in the man-
agement of the projects were conducted.1 
 
The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part (Chapters 2-5), the technical 
(Chapter 2), theoretical (Chapter 3), local (Chapter 4) and programmatic (Chapter 5) 
conditions are explained, which build a basis for the second part (Chapters 6-8), the 
empirical analysis of the sustainability of community-managed micro hydels. The last 




2 Micro Hydro Power Technology 
Harnessing hydro power on a small scale is one possible approach to the decentralised 
electrification of rural areas and nowadays a considerable number, yet with a still mod-
est importance compared to big dams, of micro hydro power installations can be found 
in many parts of the world. In this context, attention has to be paid as there is no stan-
dardised definition of the different sizes of hydro power installations. The common 
ground for most definitions is that they are based on the capacity of the system.2 In this 
paper the definition of the World Bank (2006) is used, that defines a micro power plant 
as an installation with a capacity between 5 kW and 100 kW. As there is no universally 
accepted definition, ‘micro hydel’ and ‘micro hydro power’ are used coequally in this 
paper. Furthermore, the expressions ‘system / installation / scheme / plant’ are de-
fined as only looking at the physical constitution, while ‘project’ always includes the 
managing community. 
 
Hydro electricity uses energy in falling water to spin a turbine to produce electricity. 
While there are various possibilities for the layout of a hydro power scheme,3 micro 
hydels in developing countries are most often designed as ‘run-of-river’ schemes.4 As 
seen in Figure 3 these projects have no storage reservoir. The water is either directly 
drawn from the stream or by using an intake structure and a small dam or weir, made of 
rocks to increase the water level. The water is then divided by the intake structure into 
the headrace or power canal. The headrace can be an open channel or a pipe. There-
upon the water enters the forebay, where sediments in the water settle before it enters 
                                               
1 This paper is based on the author’s Master’s Thesis handed in at the Friedrich–Alexander University Erlan-
gen–Nürnberg in August 2006. It would not have been possible to conduct this study without the support of 
many persons, the author wants to thank: all interview partners during the field visits in Chitral, for their 
enormous patience in answering the countless questions and their overwhelming hospitability; Mr. Asif Ali 
Shah and Mr. Zahidullah Khan, M&E Officers, AKRSP Chitral, for translating all questions, their sensitivity in 
dealing with the respondents, and their friendly companionship; Mr. Babar Khan, Micro Hydel Engineer, 
AKRSP Chitral, for thoroughly explaining the technical issues of micro hydro power; Mr. Sadar Ayub, Area 
Manager Chitral, AKRSP Chitral, for providing comprehensive background information on AKRSP’s micro hydel 
programme; Mr. Ehsan-ul-Haq, Manager M&E, AKRSP Chitral, for his support in the interpretation of the field 
data and his continuous encouragement; Mr. Abdul Malik, Programme Manager Resource Development/M&E, 
AKRSP, for the opportunity to conduct this study and his constructive criticism and guidance through the 
research work, and Mr. Prof. Dr. Hermann Kreutzmann, Director of the Centre of Developing Countries Re-
search, Free University Berlin, for getting the internship into gear, his encouragement, and his support dur-
ing the process of writing. 
2 Meier 2001: 49. 
3 The layout of a scheme is chiefly dependent on the head (actual height that the water drops), which is 
determined by the topography of the location. For possible layouts of micro hydels see Meier 2001: 50f. 
4 World Bank 2006. 
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the penstock. Most schemes generally have a spillway, to safely remove excess water. 
The penstock, most often steel-made, is a high pressure-pipe that conveys the water 
from the forebay to the turbine, placed inside the powerhouse. The spent water returns 
via a tailrace back to the river.1 
Due to the non-existence of a reservoir, micro hydro technology “can be regarded as a 
technology with only minimal environmental impacts.”2 
 
 
 Figure 1: Basic Components of a Village Micro Hydro Power Scheme  
   Source: Greacen 2004: 12, after Inversin 1986. 
 
Inside the powerhouse, water exits the penstock through a specially designed nozzle. By 
striking the turbine the energy from the falling water changes into rotational energy 
which, transferred by means of a belt, spins a generator that transforms the mechanical 
rotational energy into electrical energy.3 
 
Any variation in the speed of the generator will result in frequency and, in spite the fact 
that most generators have some sort of voltage regulation, also in voltage. As these 
variations threaten the life of the consumers’ electrical devices and also of the genera-
tor, the main principle is to keep the generator’s speed constant, which is one of the 
most delicate issues in micro hydel operation.4 Therefore three different options are 
possible: 
(1) Flow Control Governor: Every time consumers switch on the lights or any kind of 
devices, the load on the generator increases, resulting in lower speed. This reduction in 
speed is sensed by a mechanical or electrical device that causes the governor to open 
the appropriate valve to admit more water to the turbine. Similarly, if appliances are 
                                               
1 Greacen 2004: 12. 
2 Meier 2001: 54. 
3 Greacen 2004: 13. 
4 Meier 2001: 60f. 
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switched off, the load on the generator decreases, and the generator senses a speed 
increase. Thereupon, the water flow through the turbine is reduced by closing the ap-
propriate valves. In general, flow control governors are too expensive and difficult to 
maintain for micro hydels.1 
(2) Load Control Governors control, as the name suggests, the load on the generator and 
not the flow through the machine. They are less complex and costly, although “it may 
be difficult to get them repaired if electronic components fail in the field.”2 
(3) Manual Control: Throughout the world, micro hydels are often manually controlled,3 
either using flow control or load control. Thereby the plant needs to be supervised by 
an operator who makes the necessary adjustments if the turbine speed changes. By ob-
serving the voltage and frequency meters at the panel board, the operator opens or 
closes a flow-regulating gate valve until the meters match the required level.4 
 
The distribution system brings electricity from the generator to the end-users. The sys-
tem consists of poles, wires and most often meters for measuring electricity consump-
tion. If users are particular far from the generator, transformers are used to increase 
the voltage for transmission and to step it back for consumer use.5 
 
The various parts of a micro hydel need to be maintained carefully: Regarding the water 
supply line, routine operations include the inspection of the channel, the forebay tank, 
and the removal of debris. Depending on the nature of the channel and the clearness of 
the water, the channel has to be cleaned one or more times per year. 
Regarding the electro-mechanical equipment, moving parts have to be greased or lubri-
cated regularly. Belt drives have to be maintained to keep the belt at the correct ten-
sion and free from grease. Special attention has to be paid to bearings which must run 
smoothly. In case of vibrations the operator should be capable of diagnosing the defec-
tive parts and conducting the necessary repairs so that further damage is prevented. In 
the case of manual control, uninterrupted attendance and observation by an operator 
during the process of operation is necessary. All transmission lines have to be checked 
regularly and if necessary cleared of tree branches as these cause earth faults and short 
circuits. In order to reduce downtimes, every micro hydel should have an inventory of 
appropriate spare parts and tools. In total, a considerable share of the revenues has to 
be spent on operation and maintenance of the system.6 
                                               
1 Meier 2001: 61. 
2 Meier 2001: 62. 
3 The same applies for AKRSP-assisted micro hydels in Chitral. 
4 Meier 2001: 63. 
5 Greacen 2004: 14. 
6 Meier 2001: 63f. 
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3 Common Property Perspective of Community-Managed 
Micro Hydels 
3.1 Micro Hydro Power and the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’  
Where a micro hydel is managed by a community the success of the project is highly 
dependent on the collective action of the users. An important aspect thereby is that a 
communal micro hydro power plant has characteristics of a commons,1 or in economic 
terms a common-pool resource (CPR). According to Ostrom (1999: 38), a CPR is a natural 
resource or a human-built facility that is characterised by two features: (1) It generates 
finite quantities of resource units, where one person’s use subtracts the quantity of 
resource units available for others, and (2) the exclusion of potential beneficiaries is 
costly, yet not impossible. These characteristics also apply for a community-managed 
micro hydel. One the one hand, the quantity of electricity is limited by the capacity of 
the plant as well as the availability of water. On the other hand, once users are electri-
fied, it is difficult and costly to restrict access to consumption of the resource. Anyone 
with an electricity outlet can plug in appliances and over-consumption by some can de-
grade the resource base for all.2 
 
The result of these problems is, according to the conventional theory of CPRs, that the 
users of a micro hydel would not be able to manage the system over a longer period of 
time because they would be unable to overcome the temptation to pursue short-term, 
‘selfish’ benefits: In his famous article “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Hardin (1968) 
argues that common property will always be over-exploited and finally destroyed as the 
gain which users make through over-using will outweigh the loss they suffer as a result 
of this over-use. He uses an example of a herdsman, who keeps his cattle on a common 
pasture. With every cow the herdsman adds to his herd, he gains more than he loses: He 
is one cow richer, while the community as a whole bears the costs of the additional 
cow.3  
In order to prevent this tragedy from happening, many economists and planners made 
recommendations that external authorities must impose a set of regulations on such a 
setting, either by privatising or nationalising the common property.4 In the context of 
rural electrification through micro hydels, the conventional theory would therefore 
promote the ‘public utility’ or ‘private company model’. 
 
On the other hand, the “growing evidence from many studies of common-pool resources 
in the field [has] called for a serious re-thinking of the theoretical foundations for the 
analysis of common-pool resources.”5 As a result it has become accepted that neither 
the state nor the market always guarantee sustainable and effective utilisation of natu-
                                               
1 The word ‚commons’ refers to a shared area of land, by extension the term has also been applied to other 
resources to which a community has rights or access. 
2 Greacen 2004: 21. For a more detail description on CPR-characteristics of community-managed micro hy-
dels refer to Section 3.2. 
3 The ‘tragedy of the commons’ has often been formalized as a collective ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. See Runge 
1992. 
4 Ostrom 2000: 31. 
5 Ostrom 2000: 32. 
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ral resources. As seen in different cases,1 communities have governed resources without 
state or market institutions for a long period of time with significant success.2  
The reason for this success is the evolution of “adequate rules for resource utilisation”2 
or “decision-making arrangements that are well matched to the system’s techni-
cal/physical characteristics.”3 
 
3.2 CPR-Characteristics of Community-Managed Micro Hydels 
A framework developed by Oakerson (1990) suggests a useful guide to exploring charac-
teristics of CPRs in general but also those of community-managed micro hydels. As can 
be seen in Figure 2, the frame distinguishes four sets of systematic related attributes: 
“(1) The physical attributes of the specific resource or facility and the technology used 
to appropriate its yield; (2) the decision-making arrangements (organizations and rules) 
that govern the relationships among users, as well as relevant others; (3) the mutual 
choices of strategies and consequent patterns of interaction among decision-makers; 




Figure 2: Framework for Analysing Common-Pool Resources 
 Source: Own presentation, based on Oakerson 1992: 53. 
 
As “problems of the commons are rooted in constraints given in nature or inherent in 
available technology,”6 in this model the physical attributes of the resource refer to 
three considerations:  
First, the relative capacity of the resource base to provide benefit to multiple users at 
the same time without one interfering with another or diminishing the aggregate yield 
of the resource available to the group. This concern refers to the economic concept of 
jointness, which was originally introduced to define ‘pure public goods’5 and means that 
                                               
1 For instance see Schmidt 2004 & 2005. 
2 Schmidt 2004: 317. 
3 Oakerson 1992: 55. 
4 Oakerson 1992: 43. 
5 An example for a ‘pure public good’ might be a radio broadcast: Irrespective of the number of tuned-in 
listeners, the broadcast signal is not diminished. The opposite would be a ‘private good’, which an individual 
fully consumes, making it unavailable for others: After having eaten a loaf of bread, it is no longer available 
for others. 
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one person’s use does not subtract from the use of others. In contrast, ‘impure public 
goods’ are those where jointness is limited by congestion. Beyond a certain threshold, 
additional consumption subtracts from the others’ beneficial use.1  
As outlined in the beginning of this chapter, community-managed micro hydels, like 
many CPRs, have characteristics of impure public goods. The electricity production is 
dependent on the amount of available water and the installed capacity of the machin-
ery. If collective consumption is below this level, the system behaves like a pure public 
good and, due to the fact that electricity which is not used in a micro hydel system can 
be considered as wasted electricity, the marginal costs of consumption are zero. But if 
the consumption is above the threshold, the power quality for all users is degraded. The 
limited nature of the electricity production and the possibility for individual users to 
plug in large numbers of (energy-hungry) appliances, therefore leads to jointness prob-
lems.2  
 
Second is the degree to which the commons permits the exclusion of individual users. 
The concept of ‘exclusion’, which was originally used by economists to differentiate 
between private and public goods, broadly refers to the ability to exclude access from 
any type of good, including the commons. The opposite of exclusion is complete open-
ness, in which all users have unlimited access. “Although an organized commons need 
not be characterized by open access, the commons always has an access-control prob-
lem to some degree.”3 
In discussing CPR aspects of community-managed micro hydels it is useful to differenti-
ate between two forms of exclusion: on the one hand related to the entrance of new 
users, on the other hand the level of consumption of existing users. In a community-
owned micro hydro power system, the electricity is carried to individual households via 
a mini grid. Those who are not connected are excluded from the consumption. As long 
as illegitimate connections can be identified and removed, access is relatively easy to 
be controlled. Among those who are already connected, however, exclusion must be 
accomplished by restricted appliance use – as we will see later a more sensitive pros-
pect.4 
 
The third attribute of the commons is indivisibility: The degree to which the commons 
can be divided. Spatial divisibility and the establishment of boundaries is a key in the 
process of converting a commons into private property. CPRs have physical characteris-
tics that inherently hamper physical partitioning or even make it impossible. In a micro 
hydro power system the electricity production takes place in one single powerhouse, 
making it impossible to divide the system. While the resource system is so subject to 
common utilisation, the resource units are not used commonly. Therefore improvements 
(e.g. as a result of maintenance work) of the system are available for every user at the 
same time, regardless of whether he contributed to the improvement, or not.5 
 
                                               
1 Oakerson 1992: 43f. 
2 Greacen 2004: 23f. 
3 Oakerson 1991: 44. 
4 Greacen 2004:  24. 
5 Ostrom 1999: 40. 
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The second set of attributes in the framework consists of decision-making arrangements 
– rules that structure individual and collective choices with respect to the commons as 
defined by the first set of attributes. Of interest here are the relationships of who has 
the authority to determine what in relation to whom. Decision-making arrangements 
can be sorted into three subsets: First are operational rules that serve to limit the us-
ers’ behaviour in the interest of maintaining the commons, second are conditions of 
collective choice that describe how the group decides to modify operational rules and 
third are external arrangements – decision-structures outside the community that influ-
ence the use and organisation of the CPR.1 The way decision-making arrangements in 
the context of community-managed micro hydels are organised and how successful they 
are is the objective of the empirical part of this paper and will be presented in Chapter 
6. 
Given the physical and technical characteristics of the commons on the one hand (arrow 
a) and the decision-making arrangements available to govern its use on the other (arrow 
b), individuals make choices from which patterns of interaction emerge. The individual 
choices, which can be understood as a result of the comparison of the costs and benefits 
of alternative actions,2 can be shaped in two ways: Either to cooperate and mutually 
contribute to one another’s benefit through ‘collective action’, such as contributing to 
the maintenance of the micro hydel, or to free-ride and look only at one’s own individ-
ual self-interest. If enough free-riding takes place, reciprocity is eroded and ‘the trag-
edy of the commons’ occurs.3 
Finally, patterns of behaviour (arrow d) combined with the physical characteristics of 
the resource (arrow c) produce physical outcomes, in regards to a hydro power system a 
reliable and adequately powerful flow of electricity. 
In summary, the common property perspective suggests looking for explanations of dif-
ficulties in the community management of micro hydro systems in “a mismatch between 
the technical and physical nature […] and the decision-making arrangements used to 
govern its use.”4 This relationship is described in the framework by the arrow e. 
 
3.3 Implications on Research Questions 
As we have seen, CPR theory suggests that a key determinate of successful community-
managed micro hydels is the evolution of institutions5 that are well matched to the sys-
tem’s characteristics. Thereby micro hydel systems are characterised by the need to 
regulate the consumption of electricity and the demand for operation and maintenance. 
Looking at the micro hydro power projects in the area of research with the theoretical 
background depicted above, the following questions arise: 
• What kind of institutions can be found in the projects? 
                                               
1 Oakerson 1992: 46f. 
2 Ostrom 2000: 35. 
3 Oakerson 1992: 49f. 
4 Oakerson 1992: 55. 
5 Although Oakerson’s definition of ‚decision-making arrangements’ comprises “organisations and rules” 
(Oakerson 1992: 43), in the following the more common expression of North (1990: 3f) is used. He talks 
about ‘institutions’ that include both the governing rules for utilisation and the organisations which define, 
influence and control such rules.  
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• Do the institutions match to the systems’ characteristics and, if not, what is the 
impact on the sustainability of the projects? 
 
While basic attributes of micro hydel projects have been outlined, sustainability as the 
dependent variable has not yet been defined. In the framework used above, Oakerson 
(1992: 51) suggests that “patterns of interaction produce physical outputs.” While at 
first glance these physical outputs can be considered as the quality and quantity of pro-
duced electricity, in this study the more universal, if difficult to quantify, term of ‘sus-
tainability’ will be used. In the ex-post perspective the sustainability of a community-
managed micro hydel can only have two values: Either the micro hydel is working (1) or 
it is abandoned (0). While the abandoned projects can solely be surveyed in regard to 
the reasons which lead to the abandonment (Chapter 8), the working ones might show 
certain variation of sustainability under an ex-ante perspective. 
In Chapter 2 the demands for the operation and maintenance of a micro hydel have 
been outlined, which can be summarised as follows: Unskilled labour (a) for the opera-
tion and maintenance of civil engineering components, skilled labour (b) for the opera-
tion and maintenance of electrical and mechanical components, as well as financial 
resources (c). According to these demands that the operation and maintenance of a 
micro hydel make on a community, the project’s sustainability is defined as comprising 
the following, overlapping criteria:1 
(a) Social Sustainability: The community possesses the motivation to operate and main-
tain the micro hydel. 
(b) Technical Sustainability: The community possesses the technical capacity to operate 
and maintain the micro hydel. 
(c) Financial Sustainability: The community possesses enough funding for the operation 
and maintenance of the micro hydel. 
 
One important aspect has to be kept in mind while analysing the institutional mecha-
nisms applied in the micro hydro power projects in the area of research. Constructing a 
micro hydel in a remote and mountainous area of North Pakistan and thereupon trans-
ferring ownership to a local community does not symbolise the emergence of a new 
institution for the management of the scheme. On the contrary, the economical life in 
the area of research is characterised by a traditional, environmentally sensitive system 
of high mountain agriculture with irrigation as a key factor. For the maintenance of 
these systems, every village has its own traditional rules which have been developed 
over centuries2 and are also likely to influence the management mechanisms regarding 
micro hydels.3 Reflections on the role of these indigenous institutions, which will be 
described in the following chapter together with other influencing regional factors, play 
an important role in the current management mechanisms and therefore have to be part 
of this study. 
                                               
1 Due to the fact that micro hydels avoid detrimental environmental impacts, it is possible to refuse the 
utilisation of an ecological component in the definition of sustainability in the context of micro hydro power 
plants. 
2 Holdschlag 2000: 138f. 
3 Ostrom 2004: 3. 
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4 Local Setting: Chitral District 
4.1 Overview 
The area of research is Chitral, the northernmost district of the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, bordering in the west with Afghanistan and in the east 
with the federally administered Northern Areas of Pakistan. The district, which can be 
divided into two subdivisions (Upper and Lower Chitral) covers a total area of 14,850 
square kilometres.1 It is 
bounded on the north-
west by the Hindu Kush, 
on the north-east by the 
Karakorum and on the 
south by the Hindu Raj 
Range. A key feature of 
Chitral is its isolated 
location. The main en-
trance to the valley is 
Lowari Pass (3,118m) in 
the South, which is closed 
due to snow for about 
five to six months every 
winter, cutting the area 





Location of Chitral District 
within Pakistan and its 
Neighbouring Countries 
Source:  Marsden 2005: XV. 
4.2 Natural Hazards  
The Chitral valley and some 30 subsidiary valleys are drained by the Chitral River, which 
has different names along separate stretches, and its tributaries. Mean rainfall is ap-
proximately between 500 mm in Chitral Town and 650 mm in Drosh (Lower Chitral), 
occurring mainly in the spring and winter, while the summer and autumn are dry with 
monthly precipitation of 10-25 mm.2 Not the direct rainfall, but rather melt water from 
snow and glaciers mainly controls the hydrological regime, especially of the main rivers. 
Their maximum discharges occur in summer and is twelve times more than in winter.3 
Therefore for people in Chitral water is the main natural risk factor, making water 
shortage a serious problem for most of them. In the harsh, dry and hot climate, water is 
not only of importance as drinking water, it is also the foundation of the agriculture, 
                                               
1 For a detailed map pf Chitral refer to Figure 7, p. 28. 
2 IUCN Pakistan n.d.b: 5. 
3 NWFP & IUCN Pakistan 2004: 8f. 
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which is still the most important employment sector. Furthermore, the seasonally fluc-
tuating water supply can episodically vary extremely, too. Some valleys that receive 
sufficient amounts of water in ‘normal’ years suffer from grave shortages in dry peri-
ods.1 
In contrast to the problem of droughts, large amounts of water in the alpine environ-
ment, which is characterised by high relief energy, can cause sudden gravitational mass 
movements, especially resulting from intense rain and snowmelt. Such processes, known 
as ‘mountain hazards’ imperil the assets and lives of the people in Chitral in the form of 
landslides, mudflows, avalanches and snowstorms but primary with high water and 
floods.1 
 
4.3 Cultural Complexity 
Before merging as a district into NWFP, the territory of Chitral was an independent 
monarchical state until the late nineteenth century, when the British negotiated a 
forced treaty with its hereditary ruler, the Mehtar (literally owner), under which Chitral 
become a semi-autonomous princely state within the Indian Empire. Chitral was fully 
incorporated into Pakistan and NWFP in 1969.2  
Today Chitral, while comprising 20% of the area of NWFP, makes up with around 370,000 
inhabitants only 2% of the province’s population.3 Close to 90% of Chitral’s population 
resides in rural settlements, making Chitral the least urbanised province in Pakistan4 
with the district capital Chitral (Town) as the only urban settlement. Most people are 
living in joint family systems, comprising on average 10 persons per household.5 
Compared to the rest of Pakistan, the people of Chitral are poor: The average per cap-
ita income stands at 11,090 Rupees (Rs.) (in 2001),6 which is around half the average 
per capita income of Pakistan as a whole.7 Many people try to escape the poverty 
through migration, making especially temporary/seasonal inter-regional migrant labour 
an important role in the society. Out-migration usually starts in autumn with the end of 
the agricultural season and ends in spring with the majority returning back to the places 
of origin. This has a strong impact on the family structures as the female members are 
left behind for months, having to manage the household affairs.8  
The population of Chitral is characterised by a “great cultural and linguistic complex-
ity”9 and comprises a variety of ethnic groups with different languages, customs, pro-
duction systems and know-hows. The majority of people belong to the Khow ethnic 
group and speak Khowar.10 Pashto, the language of the Pashtuns has become the main 
                                               
1 Holdschlag & Fazlur-Rahman 2004: 2. 
2 Marsden 2005: 13. 
3 AKRSP Chitral 2004: 11. 
4 Holdschlag 2000: 133. 
5 GTZ 2005: 8f. 
6 By using the official exchange rate on 31/12/2001 of 0.0170 (Oanda.com 2006) this is equivalent to € 
188.53  (ignoring Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) adjustment). 
7 NWFP & IUCN Pakistan 2004: 9. 
8 Holdschlag 2000: 147f. 
9 Marsden 2005: 24.  
10 Few people in Chitral actually write in Khowar, as most use Urdu, the national language of Pakistan for 
correspondence. Official business is conducted both in English and Urdu. 
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spoken language in the southern valleys of Chitral1 where several settlements by Pash-
tun migrants can be found.2 In total, more than ten languages are spoken inside Chi-
tral.3 The majority of the people in Chitral are Muslims (umma), with the exception of 
only around 2%4 that comprise mainly the 3,000 non-Muslim Kalasha people5, who have 
their own traditional beliefs. 
Approximately 35% of the Muslim population of Chitral belong to the Islamic doctrinal 
tradition of Shi’a Ismai’li; the remaining 65% are Sunni.6 The regional distribution of the 
different denominations in Chitral can be determined relatively precisely: Majority 
Sunnis are living in the Tehsils7 of Drosh and Chitral as well as in Mulkoh and the south-
ern parts of Turkoh.8 While “the boundary between Ismai’li and Sunni Muslims has 
hardened significantly over the past twenty years,”9 the extent of sectarian violence in 
Chitral “is [still] much rarer than what both many popular and academic commentators 
suggest is the norm elsewhere in Pakistan.”10 In Chitral the shape of Ismai’li identity has 
been powerfully formed by the wider geo-political context in which the region is situ-
ated: First of all, over the past thirty years Pakistan has experienced intermittent poli-
cies of state-led ‘Islamisation’, which has been formulated in response to calls for 
commitment made by Islamic political parties, many of whom have sought to impose 
Sunni legal codes and definitions of what it is to ‘be Muslim’ in Pakistan. Second, Is-
mai’lis in Chitral have felt threatened by hard-line Sunni-dominated governments in 
neighbouring Afghanistan, particular the Taliban.11 The fact that the Taliban were 
mainly belonging to the Sunni Pashtun clans, resulted in solidarity of the Pasthun com-
munity and several fundamentalist mullahs exerted a strong influence on the Sunni 
communities.12 Sunni women in Chitral strictly observe purdah13 as do the women of the 
Ismai’li community, who are generally more liberal in their response to changes.14 
Apart from ethno-linguistic and religious differentiation a further layer of different in-
terests and power is formed by various clans. These different clans are associated with 
geographical areas; however, belonging to a special clan is not a visible differentiating 
characteristic of the Chitrali Khow populations. The Khow clans can be separated into 
two subgroups: Clans associated with the royal family and clans who are lower in status. 
Belongingness to a clan and solidarity between clan members still plays a major role in 
identity building and political life.15  
                                               
1 A major reason therefore is the large numbers of Afghan refugees, who were mainly Pashtuns and settled 
since the early 1980s in the southern parts of the Chitral after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
start of the Afghan war (Grevemeyer (n.d.): 8). 
2 Holdschlag 2005: 4. 
3 Haseroth 1996: 6. 
4 Holdschlag 2005: 2. 
5 Marshen 2005: 15. 
6 Holdschlag 2005: 2. 
7 Chital can be devided into six Tehsils, namely Mastuj, Turkoh, Mulkoh, Lutkoh, Drosh, and Chitral (Holdsch-
lag 2005: 2, GoP 2006b: 1). Also refer to Figure 16, p. 59. 
8 The pattern of denominational distribution can be retraced to the regional missionary- and migration-
history (Kreutzmann 1996: 252). 
9 Marsden 2005: 17.  
10 Marsden 2005: 196. 
11 Marsden 2005: 17f.  
12 GTZ 2005: 10. 
13 Purdah literally means ‚curtain’, but also refers to a system of segregation of sexes mainly leading to the 
seclusion of women. 
14 Streefland et al. 1995: 17. 
15 GTZ 2005: 10. 
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4.4 Indigenous Resource Management 
As stated above, the availability of water is a critical factor in Chitral, making irrigation 
the most important aspect of agriculture. Due to the importance of irrigation organisa-
tion and management,1 which is necessary from the construction of a channel to a 
regular conveyance of water to the fields, Israr-ud-Din (1996: 20) labels Chitral a “hy-
draulic society”. This management was traditionally accomplished through voluntary 
social organisation. As powerful princely rulers emerged in the area, they provided ad-
ministrative, legal and financial support to many such cooperative endeavours. With the 
end of their rule, the system they fostered fell into disarray. Since then the building of 
new irrigation schemes as well as the development of other infrastructure projects and 
the creation of grassroots organisations for their maintenance was encouraged by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs).2 The importance of social organisation is not only 
reflected in the management systems of irrigation channels, but is also of significance 
for other assets and recourses. 
The indigenous unit of social organisation is called gram. All farming and herding activi-
ties were organised by this unit as well as festivals and other events. In the social hier-
archy, gram is smaller than a village and bigger than a household. The spirit behind this 
system is trust and mutual confidence, which is binding on every member of the sys-
tem.3 Therefore as “a social unit, gram had an important role in social services among 
the self reliant but independent people of the community in a traditional Chitrali village 
or valley.”4 Main services organised and facilitated by the gram include mone, which is 
a Khowar word for an indigenous system of providing social service by term. It is a form 
of collective responsibility of a whole gram to offer collective services on occasions like 
the maintenance of water channels, bridges and roads. Those that are not participating 
in, for example, the repair or maintenance of an irrigation channel are obliged to pro-
vide food for the workers.5 Mone also applies to mutual agreement of individuals for 
particular farming activities. The system of the regular maintaining of water channels 
by collective efforts is called mirzhoi. For this purpose the gram hires the service of one 
or more persons who look after the channel. These persons are paid by the gram in a 
type of food grain at the harvest time in a certain quantity which is agreed upon by 
both parties.6  
If and what parts of the system for resource management generally described above are 
or have been in use in a certain part of Chitral has to be answered in a very differenti-
ated way. Apart from regionally differing socio-economic changes, it is important to 
note that “every village has got its own traditional and complex non-written rules.”7 
According to Israr-ud-Din (2000: 71), the success of the respective institutions highly 
depends on the amount of time allowed for its development. Whether this amount of 
time was enough to adjust the indigenous institutions to the relatively new technology 
                                               
1 See Kreutzmann 2000 for a comprehensive overview over irrigation and water management in the Inner 
Asian mountain barrier. 
2 NWFP & IUCN Pakistan 2004: 28f. 
3 IUCN Pakistan n.d.c: 5. 
4 IUCN Pakistan n.d.c: 6 
5 Israr-ud-Din 2000: 68. 
6 IUCN Pakistan n.d.c: 7f. 
7 Holdschlag 2000: 131. 
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of micro hydels and to develop new mechanisms will be examined in the further course 
of this study. 
 
4.5 Electricity Supply 
Apart from several independent power producers, electricity in Pakistan is produced by 
two integrated public sector power utilities, the Water and Power Development Author-
ity (WAPDA) and the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC).1 While KESC’s engage-
ment is limited to Karachi, WAPDA supplies power to the rest of Pakistan, including Chi-
tral.2 This happens in two ways: Firstly, a 33 kV transmission line connects Chitral Town 
to the national grid via the Lowari Pass. Secondly, WAPDA runs a 1 MW hydro power 
station in Chitral Town as well as some diesel generators.3 
 
Figure 4: Public and Private Electricity Supply in Chitral 
 Source: Own presentation.4 
 
A second energy actor in Chitral is the Sarhad Hydel Development Organisation (SHYDO). 
It was established in 1986 as a semi-autonomous body to carry out hydro power devel-
opment in rural areas working in cooperation with the GTZ (‚Gesellschaft für technische 
Zusammenarbeit’ – German Association for Technical Cooperation).5 As shown in Figure 
                                               
1 Fraser 2005: 5. 
2 GoP 2006c: 10. 
3 Interview with Mr. Faroog, Head of WAPDA Chitral in December 2005. 
4 The figure neither shows the numerous community-owned micro hydels, nor electricity generation through 
diesel generators. It also does not include private power plants that are smaller than 50 kW or produce for 
own consumption only, like the hydel of the Hindukush Heights Hotel in Chitral Town. 
5 Speech of Mr. Ejaz Qureshi, Additional Chief Secretary of NWFP in GTZ 2000: 7. 
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4, it operates a 2.8 MW hydro power station at Reshun, about 60km north of Chitral 
Town, a 300 kW hydro power station (‘Shishi’) near Drosh in Lower Chiral, as well as a 
100 kW station in Garam Chashma.1 
A third actor in the electricity sector of Chitral is Mr. Mohammad Khan, a businessman 
living in Peshawar, who operates a 640 kW mini hydro power plant in Ayun. Although the 
main purpose of the plant is to provide electricity to his marble factory, around 2,500 
households in the lower parts of Chitral receive power from it.2 
The fourth actor comprises the several NGOs that have installed a considerable number 
of community-managed micro hydels. The Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP) has 
built seven micro hydels, the Chitral Area Development Programme (CADP) 37 installa-
tions.3 The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) is with more than 150 installed 
micro hydro power plants4 by far the most important non-governmental player, bringing 
electricity to “50 percent of the population of Chitral.”5 Also due to AKRSP’s initiative, 
Chitral has got according to the World Bank (2002: 29) “the most schemes and the high-
est microhydel concentration in the world.” 
Nevertheless there “is scope in Chitral for many more such schemes.”6 For future hydro 
power generation WAPDA has identified a potential of 100 MW, while SHYDO has indi-
cated a further potential of 190 MW.7 This is needed badly: Only about 77% of all house-
holds in Chitral are electrified; the remaining 83,000 people do not have access to elec-
tric power supply at all,8 and also those being electrified suffer, as we will see later, 
under the unreliability of the supply. 
 
One main barrier to bringing electricity to all people in Chitral is of an institutional na-
ture: The World Conservation Union (IUCN) Pakistan (n.d.a: 14) states that there “is no 
close coordination among different stakeholders of the energy sector, irrespective of 
GOs [Governmental Organisations] and NGOs. For example, in Chitral, WAPDA, SHYDO 
[…] and AKRSP are working in the hydro electricity sector but they all lack coordination. 
They mostly do not understand one another’s programme. Occasionally, these agencies 
start their work in the same areas without informing the others.” And also according to 
GTZ (2005: II), the “rural decentralised power supply sector is not well structured” as 
there is among others “a lack of dialogue between potential energy developers and 
[the] government.”  
                                               
1 GTZ 2005: 13. 
2 Interview with Mr. Mohammad Khan, December 2005. 
3 Interview with Mr. Babar Khan, AKRSP Micro Hydel Engineer, November 2005. 
4 AKRSP Chitral database. 
5 AKRSP Chitral 2004: 27. 
6 World Bank 2002: 109. 
7 NWFP & IUCN 2004: 26. 
8 GTZ 2005: 13. 
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5 Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) and its  Mi-
cro Hydel Projects 
5.1 AKRSP’s Structure and Areas of Operation 
The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme was founded in 1982 by the Aga Khan Founda-
tion (AKF). This private, non-profitable organisation was established in 1967 by the Aga 
Khan, the spiritual leader of the Shi’a Ismai’li Muslims.1 AKF is part of the Aga Khan De-
velopment Network (AKDN), which brings together a number of international develop-
ment agencies, institutions and programmes that work primarily in the poorest parts of 
South and Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East. AKF, which both implements pro-
jects and provides grants, is non-denominational like all other AKDN agencies.2 
 
 
Figure 5: Aga Khan Rural Support Programme in Northern Pakistan 
 Source: Own presentation. 
 
AKRSP’s engagement is not limited to Chitral: As seen in Figure 5, AKRSP’s programme 
area comprises six districts in total, five in the federally administered Northern Areas 
and finally Chitral covering a population of around 1.3 million people in total.3 AKRSP’s 
headquarters (‘Core Office’) is situated in Gilgit, with one Regional Office in each of the 
programme areas, where Area Offices can additionally be found. 
AKRSP, which employs around 230 staff members from all religious communities of the 
programme area, is funded by several international governments and their development 
agencies. As a major precondition for the financial support by several donors, AKRSP is 
not confined to the Ismai’li community but serves the entire population. The whole pro-
gramme has been evaluated four times by the World Bank (1987, 1990, 1996, 2002) as 
an independent party which stated that the “achievements of AKRSP have been highly 
                                               
1 See Section 4.3. 
2 AKF 2004: 4f. 
3 AKRSP 2006. 
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satisfactory” with “remarkable results.”1 AKRSP’s overall goal is the “reduction of pov-
erty through sustainable improvements in livelihoods in the Northern Areas and Chi-
tral.”2 In order to reach this goal, AKRSP works in four, closely bounded fields (Market-, 
Resource-, and Institutional-Development, Gender and Development). 
 
5.2 Community Organisation and Productive Physical Infrastructure 
The central focus of AKRSP’s approach has always been the direct integration of the 
village population into the process of decision-making, planning and implementation of 
programme packages. Therefore, local self-help organisations – so-called ‘Village Or-
ganisations’ (VOs) – had to be established by the villagers themselves. As seen in Section 
4.4, the indigenous unit of social organisation in Chitral is the gram. By the introduction 
of Village Organisations, AKRSP translated this “indigenous system into modern terms”3 
and aimed at filling at the local level the institutional vacuum, left behind after the 
abolition of the feudal rulers. Concerning AKRSP’s model of development, VOs are both 
objective and instrument. The aim of the programme is the creation of self-sustaining 
institutions at village level to deal locally with the people’s needs. To implement the 
programme inputs, the VOs participate in AKRSP packages. 
The concept of VOs was later widened to ‘Women Organisations’ (WOs) and finally to 
the joining of several VOs and WOs into so called ‘Clusters’. In Chitral, 1,345 organisa-
tions (VOs and WOs) have been set up by AKRSP in total, covering almost three-quarters 
of the rural households.4 
Initially, the setting up of VOs and their later supervision was conducted by AKRSP’s 
‘Social Organisers’, while under the current strategy this task should be given to so-
called Local Support Organisations (LSOs) which will act as formal intermediaries be-
tween VOs/WOs and various service providers.5 With this strategic shift, some more 
changes affected the Village Organisations: While in the initial stage regular meetings of 
all VO members were obligatory, nowadays this procedure is up to each single organisa-
tion. The same applies for collective savings. Until 2002 AKRSP ran a highly successful 
micro finance programme under which all VO members had to save a certain amount of 
money. With the establishment of the autonomous First Micro Finance Bank Ltd. through 
AKRSP, many communities have given up these regular savings. 
 
Closely linked with the establishment of VOs, WOs or Clusters is the provision of grants 
by AKRSP for improvements of the rural infrastructure. The purpose of these ‘Productive 
Physical Infrastructure’ (PPI) projects is the removal of local bottlenecks for increased 
production and economic development. Nevertheless, AKRSP never sees physical infra-
structure development as an economic investment only, but its value is “also assessed 
against the criterion of its ability to promote collective action. In other words, AKRSP 
[…] [looks] at the interaction between community infrastructure development and social 
                                               
1 World Bank 2002: xiii. 
2 AKRSP 2001: 5. 
3 IUCN Pakistan (n.d.c): 6. 
4 AKRSP 2004a: 24. 
5 The service providers include AKRSP, the government, donors and other NGOs, as well as private sector 
entities. 
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organisation as a ‘symbiotic relationship’ where two processes reinforce each other.”1 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, according to CPR theory the evolution of institutional 
mechanisms is the key factor for a sustainable utilisation of natural resources and, as 
shown for the example of micro hydels, also for sustaining collective action for the 
maintenance of commonly-owned infrastructure. On the other side, social organisation 
and the setting up of institutions requires motivation in terms of adequate benefits. 
These should derive from the PPIs, which AKRSP therefore uses as an ‘entry point’ to 
start and promote partnerships with the local communities. In shaping the ‘Institution 
VO’, the community is equipped with considerable freedom. Organisational instructions 
by AKRSP are limited to the selection of a VO president, representing the organisation 
outwardly, and a VO manager, being in charge of all internal affairs. The same applies 
for WOs and Clusters. 
The type of PPI which AKRSP supports a community organisation with is always chosen 
by its members according to their needs. After more than twenty years of partnership 
between AKRSP and the rural communities in North Pakistan, in Chitral alone around 
870 PPIs have been built. Apart from irrigation channels and roads, the most important 
infrastructure projects in Chitral are micro hydels with more than 150 schemes been 
built by AKRSP.2 However, one should not overlook that approximately 30 these micro 
hydels have since been abandoned.3 
 
5.3 Micro Hydel Programme  
5.3.1 Community Involvement 
The first step in the establishment of a micro hydro power project, as for most other 
PPIs, is always led by community demand with community representatives initially ap-
proaching AKRSP to explore the possibility of support. AKRSP then initiatives a three-
stage ‘dialogue process’. Therein great emphasis is put on ensuring that the community 
takes responsibility for the project. 
During the 1st Dialogue, the AKRSP approach is explained to the community and the 
VO/WO/Cluster, if not already existing, is formed and a possible project is selected. In 
order to assess the feasibility of the PPI in the 2nd Dialogue, a technical and social sur-
vey of the proposed project is conducted and potential points of conflict are discussed 
with the community. During the 3rd Dialogue the Terms of Partnership (ToP) about the 
division of responsibilities between AKRSP and the community are drawn up and signed 
by AKRSP representatives and all members of the community organisation. This dialogue 
usually takes place in an open area with the majority of households to ensure the 
maximum possible participation and transparency.  
 
 
                                               
1 Malik et al. 2006: 111. 
2 AKRSP Chitral 2005: 8. 
3 Own estimation. 
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According to the Terms of Partnership the responsibilities of AKRSP are as follows:1 
Provision of Non-Local Materials and Labour Costs: AKRSP only provides non-local mate-
rial, e.g. mechanical and electrical equipment; the provision of local materials like the 
wooden poles or stones for the construction of the channel and powerhouse are to be 
supplied by the community. AKRSP meets the costs of skilled labour as well as a certain 
share of the costs of non-skilled labour. That means that all work on the micro hydel – 
especially the channel, where unskilled labour is required – is conducted by the VO 
members. AKRSP pays them for their work but with wages that are lower than the stan-
dard rate for unskilled labour. The difference is the community contribution to the pro-
ject. Dependent on the negotiations with the community but also due to differing donor 
requirements, the communities contribute in this way between 10 to 50% of the total 
scheme costs. In some rare cases communities even make a cash contribution. In total, 
the average AKRSP grant per micro hydel project is about $ 10,600, equivalent to $ 150 
per household.2 
Limited Responsibility: AKRSP is not responsible for purchasing the land for the site of 
the project. It provides financial support only according to the agreement and will not 
increase or decrease it afterwards. AKRSP will not pay any emergency expenses (e.g. 
due to natural disasters) incurred during the construction of the project. 
Right to Rescind: If the community breaks the agreement, then AKRSP has the right to 
withdraw its support during the construction of the project. 
 
The community has the following responsibilities: 
Project Identification: The community has to agree on a project on a need basis. 
Provision of Local Materials and Labour (see above). 
Provision of Project Site: The site identified for the project (powerhouse and channel) 
has to be provided by the community free of costs. 
Conflict Resolution: The community has to solve all conflicts raised before, during or 
after the construction of the projects. 
Financial Records: The community is obliged to maintain a record of all the expenses 
incurred in the project. 
Maintenance of Project: The community has to complete the project in the estimated 
completion period (generally between three and six months) and ensure the mainte-
nance of the project after the completion. 
Formation of Committee: In order to monitor the construction of the project according 
to the given design, the community has to form a committee that is accountable to the 
VO. In practice, however, three committees are formed, namely a Financial Committee, 
accountable for keeping bills and receipts during the construction process, a Project 
Committee responsible for the construction process and an Electric Management Com-
mittee (EMC) responsible for all maintenance activities. The first two committees men-
tioned are generally dissolved after the completion of the construction. 
                                               
1 AKRSP Chitral micro hydel files. Documents are written in Urdu, kindly translated into English by Mr. Asif Ali 
Shah. The Terms of Partnership between AKRSP and the communities slightly vary with the course of time 
but also due to differing donor requirements. 
2 World Bank 2002: 109. 
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Maintenance Fund: In order to have sufficient financial liquidity in case of larger break-
downs, the community has to raise a Maintenance Fund. 
 
If the ToP are agreed, a first share of the costs is released to the community and the 
implementation is initiated. With the fund provided by AKRSP, the villagers, under su-
pervision of AKRSP, are required to purchase their own materials and equipment. This 
ensures that community representatives understand where equipment can be obtained 
in future.  
 
5.3.2 Technology, Operation and Maintenance 
All AKRSP-assisted hydro power schemes are run-of-the-water installations without 
dams. Due to the tradition of irrigation channel construction and water-powered milling 
in Chitral, the concept of power from water has readily been understood and accepted 
by the communities. The programme builds on this capacity by making use of locally 
available skills like traditional methods of intake and canal construction.  
In order to enable the communities to maintain and operate the machinery as inde-
pendently as possible, but also due to economic reasons the design of the micro hydels 
is quite simple: The vast majority of them are equipped with simple crossflow turbines 
and relatively cheap Chinese-made generators. Apart from this, all components are 
manufactured within Pakistan. Community-produced electricity can be easily distin-
guished from governmental or private power as those use steel poles, while in all 
AKRSP-assisted micro hydels the grid is made of locally available and easier and cheaper 
replaceable wooden poles. Almost no implemented schemes are provided with flow or 
load control governors and are therefore manually controlled by using flow control. The 
low population density and the desire to reach as many households as possible, often 
requires the use of long distribution lines that typically cost between 30 to 40% of the 
total scheme costs.1 Nevertheless, the “average scheme costs are relatively low”2 com-
pared to other micro hydro hydels. 
 
Due to the non-existence of coercive rules, each community establishes its own systems 
for operating and maintaining their hydro hydel. Advice is offered by AKRSP; however, 
the community will create their own specific institutional mechanisms. Decisions re-
garding the hydel are generally made by the Electric Management Committee (EMC). 
Identical in every project is the fact that one person (operator) is selected by the com-
munity to operate the machine. He received training from AKRSP and is now responsible 
for the community getting electricity. If he has technical questions, the operator refers 
to a manual, designed and handed over to him by AKRSP. AKRSP also provides him with 
refreshment trainings. For his work, the operator receives a monthly salary from the 
community, which is generally collected through the electricity bills. Also, sometimes 
paid by the community is a watchman, whose responsibility is the supervision of the 
channel. The amount of the salaries as well as the billing policy is decided by the com-
munity, which also has to ensure that enough money is available to cover the costs for 
regular maintenance as well as larger repairs. Spare parts and repairs are available from 
                                               
1 Simon 1998: 10f. 
2 Simon 1998: i. 
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one of the five micro hydel shops in Chitral Town, which were founded with support by 
AKRSP. 
The rationale of the consequent involvement of the community in the design and con-
struction and their obligation to establish their own management systems is to ensure 
that ownership is taken by the communities. To what extent this has really been suc-
cessful, namely whether the community-set up institutions ensure a sustainable opera-
tion of the plants, will be discussed in Chapters 6-8. 
 
5.3.3 Impacts 
In order to understand the motivation of a community to operate and maintain a micro 
hydro power installation, following a brief review of some of the major impacts of the 
projects is given.1 
 
(1) Economic Impact 
Different case studies on AKRSP-assisted micro hydels suggest that all projects have a 
high degree of economic profitability: The Cost-Benefit-Analyses (CBA) show that the 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)2 in all observed projects achieves 20% and benefit-cost 
ratios range from 1.3 to 2.2 with an average discounted payback period of five years. 
Figure 6, though not representative but yet exemplary for many of AKRSP’s micro hydel 


















      Figure 6: Weighted Average Cost-Benefit-Analysis of Three Sample Projects, 2000 
      Source: Own presentation and calculation, data taken from Effendi 2000a, b, c and AKRSP databases.3 
 
                                               
1This section is based on the findings of six impact studies of AKRSP-assisted micro hydel projects (Anwar 
2002, Kenward 2000, Hasnain 2000, Effendi 2000a, b, c) as well as three papers concluding the results of 
these studies (AKRSP 2000 & 2002, HTS Development 2002). 
2 The IRR is the discount rate that results in a net present value of zero for a series of future cash flows. 
3 The results of the CBAs of the micro hydel project of the community organisations Toque, Koragh and Izh 
were averaged according to their number of electrified households. 
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The main benefits are time savings and savings on batteries and kerosene oil, while 
commercial benefits together with the income through selling the electricity to non-VO 
members (‘connection charges to outsiders’) are relatively insignificant. In Chitral kero-
sene oil has traditionally mainly been used for lighting, but after having received a con-
nection households switch to electricity for lighting. In rural Chitral fuel wood is the 
most important source of energy for cooking and heating; however, outlined in all the 
case studies is the fact that AKRSP’s micro hydel programme had relatively limited im-
pact on this pattern of consumption.1 Without electricity communities tend to power 
their radios or tape recorders with batteries; by using electricity they are now able to 
reduce these expenditures. The decreased pollution through improperly disposed bat-
teries adds to the economic benefits. The main financial benefit apart from saving 
money on kerosene and batteries is the saving of time, which mainly affects women and 
will be discussed later.2 
The six impact studies suggest that income generation through electricity is very limited 
due to insufficient power. It is confined to women selling handicrafts that are produced 
in the evening enabled through improved lighting conditions and the saving of time. As a 
result of AKRSP’s micro hydel programme a limited number of jobs have been created, 
namely the mentioned person(s) for the operation of the hydel, as well as the staff in 
the micro hydel shops. 
 
(2) Social Impact 
      (a) Health-Related Benefits 
The installation of micro hydro power schemes has resulted in households substituting 
kerosene for lighting purposes with electricity. Thereby the frequency of eye and respi-
ratory irritation caused by the kerosene oil emitted fumes has fallen. Many villages 
highlight the importance of bright light in keeping their households clean; some report 
an improved ability to detect insects like scorpions and centipedes. Medical facilities 
are able to provide improved health care through the use of good lighting, as well as 
sophisticated electrical equipment and the possibility of refrigerating medicines. By 
using refrigeration at a family or communal level, stored food can be consumed in off-
seasons or sold at higher prices and meat does not have to be consumed immediately 
after having been butchered. 
 
      (b) Education-Related Benefits 
All case studies show a strong link between electrification and the positive impact on 
education. Opposed to kerosene lamps, the bright light provided through electricity 
creates an improved environment to study in, and the number of hours children are 
spending on homework has increased significantly and so have pass-rates. 
Electricity makes the running costs of radios more affordable and by purchasing TVs and 
satellite dishes the micro hydels increase the communities’ access to mass media and 
                                               
1 A more in-depth analysis of the attributes of the electricity produced by community projects will be given 
in Section 7.1. 
2 As for a CBA all benefits have to be quantified in terms of money, also time saving is calculated by multi-
plying gained free hours with an average hourly wage for unskilled labour. The conclusion that the saved 
time leads to an increased income can therefore not be drawn.   
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allow them a better understanding of the world as well as broader options for enter-
tainment. 
An impact of electrification that has been documented in all case studies is the change 
in sleeping patterns. After the construction of a micro hydro power plant, community 
members tend to go to bed later compared to the time when the village was in ‘dark-
ness’. While men use the time for socialising, women often undertake more work, e.g. 
making handicrafts. Comments of some village men even suggest that later bedtimes led 
to a certain degree of birth control. However, international experience shows “no evi-
dence that rural electrification results in lower birth rates and assists controlling popu-
lation growth.”1  
 
      (c) Social Capital Development 
As mentioned, AKRSP has never seen micro hydels as an economic investment only, but 
also as an incentive for social organisation. During the construction of the hydel the 
community has to meet and several decisions have to be made and implemented. The 
successful completion of the project therefore not only brings about direct economic 
and social benefits as outlined above; the community also feels a sense of pride in hav-
ing contributed to the development of their village. As most impact studies show, this 
raised awareness and confidence in their abilities results in additional linkages with 
other sections of AKRSP, other AKDN institutions, different NGOs and government de-
partments.  
Nevertheless two questions arise: Firstly, is the developed social capital sufficient for 
setting up durable institutions of a sustainable long-term operation of the micro hydel 
years after the construction? Secondly, as all impact studies were conducted on working 
projects, which factors lead to an abandonment of the micro hydel, in spite of the de-
veloped social capital during the construction? 
 
(3) Impact on Women 
While all impact studies clearly show that women are affected by the electricity more 
intensively than men, the question whether their benefits increase accordingly, is an-
swered quite differently. There is consensus that they derive from health- and educa-
tion-related benefits in the same way that men do. Furthermore, the main economic 
benefit of the electrification as shown in the sample CBA in Figure 12, results from the 
saving of time, which more precisely is the time of women: Their workload is slightly 
decreased, as they do not have to prepare the evening meal with light from kerosene 
lights, clean the lanterns, wash clothes by hand or make butter and butter milk by tra-
ditional labour-intensive methods. On the other hand, the extra time in the evening 
resulting from the change of sleeping patterns is used by many women for making 
handicrafts and clothes. While in some villages the women are making income from such 
activities, which according to some authors may led to a rise of their status within the 
household,2 others claim the additional evening work has further “strengthened their 
traditional roles.”3 
                                               
1 Meier 2001: 46. 
2 AKRSP 2000: 15. 
3 AKRSP 2002: 27. 
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6 Methodology 
The objective of the empirical part of this study is to provide an insight into the institu-
tional arrangements set up by rural communities in North Pakistan for managing their 
micro hydels. Based on the technical, theoretical, local and programmatic foundation 
of community-managed micro hydels in Chitral, which have been covered in the previ-
ous parts of the study, the questions raised in Section 3.3 shall be answered.  
 
Object of research were the village representatives involved in the management of the 
hydels. After interviews and discussions with various AKRSP staff and other key respon-
dents, reviewing previous AKRSP studies about infrastructure projects and a pre-test, a 
questionnaire was developed. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way, 
often including discussions with groups of several community representatives. The field 
visits were facilitated by two Monitoring and Evaluation Officers, who translated all 
questions from English into Khowar, Urdu or Pashto. All answers were translated back 
into English. The possibility of lost information can therefore not be denied. In some 
villages the findings from the interviews were supplemented by participating observa-
tions while accompanying village representatives in activities like operating the ma-
chinery or participating in meetings of the Electric Management Committee. 
 
In order to calculate an appropriate sample size the standard formula1 was used, result-
ing in a sample size of 27 projects, which represent all AKRSP-assisted micro hydro 
power projects in Chitral. The sampled projects which are shown in Figure 7, were ran-
domly selected. The ratio of abandoned to working micro hydels within the sample 
does therefore not equal that of the population.  
 
After having finished the field visits, all data was put into spreadsheets. This gave rise 
to major contradictions in the field of the financial matters: In around 30% of the pro-
jects the development of the Maintenance Fund was not pursuable and in almost half of 
the projects the expected revenues were much lower than the actual figures given by 
the village representatives. Due to the frequency of these problems and the importance 
of financial outcomes in assessing the success of institutional mechanisms the decision 
was made to revisit the majority of projects. During these revisits no additional ques-
tions were added; the purpose was rather to clarify the above problems. In order to 
increase the reliability of information, two measures were taken: First of all, before 
restarting the field visits, all the information gained in the villages was compared with 
statements from AKRSP staff, who were asked regarding their experience while working 
with the communities, but also in their function as members or relatives of members of 
the respective communities. In a second step, it was attempted to extent the circle of 
interviewees and in spite of the partial unavailability of additional sources or the some-
                                               
1 n = (Z*S/P)2, where n is the sample size, Z the confidence interval (appropriate Z value), S the standard 
deviation and P the precision (in absolute terms). As sample frame the micro hydel-database provided by 
AKRSP Chitral was used, which, at the time of the calculation of the sample size, was 168. In order to asses 
the standard deviation, the variation of maintenance statuses between the micro hydro power projects was 
selected. Therefore AKRSP engineers were requested to estimate the degree of maintenance for a randomly 
selected sample of 30 micro hydel projects. According to these estimations the variance could be assessed 
with 1,586.81 resulting in a standard deviation of 39.83. A confidence level of 90% was considered as suffi-
cient, resulting in Z10% = 1.64, the precision was chosen with 12.5. 
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times rather centralised responsibilities in 65% of the villages, different persons were 
interviewed compared to the first field visits. 
 
Figure 7: Sampled Micro Hydel Projects in Chitral 
 Source: Own presentation. 
 
In total 85% of the communities were visited twice1 and as a whole, members of the 
following positions presented in Figure 8 were interviewed. The figure shows in what 
share of the visited villages the respective positions were established to manage the 
project2 and in how many percent of the projects members of the positions were inter-
viewed.3 In almost half of the projects, at least three different function-bearers were 
interviewed. 
The decision to revisit the micro hydels turned out to be extremely valuable. Not only 
could the problems regarding the financial matters be solved, but it also allowed access 
to difficulties the communities have to deal with, which had not fully been covered 
yet. One of the reasons for the divergence between the calculated and the actually 
collected revenues was founded by the difference between the resolutions passed by 
the communities in the beginning of the project and its practical implementation, 
which often only came to light in the second interview. Apart from the thereby discov-
ered existence of sometimes considerable amounts of dues, the mistiness regarding the 
financial matters was furthermore caused by the complexity and variety of financial 
mechanisms including varying labels for same accounts. Differing comprehensions of 
the number of electrified households added to the confusion. 
                                               
1 All working micro hydels were revisited and with the exception of four projects also all abandoned ones. 
2 For a detailed discussion on the different positions refer to Section 7.2.2. 
3 In cases where several persons obtain one position (possible in all positions except president and manager) 
one interviewed function-bearer represents the entire respective position of the village. 
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Finally, a further important reason of receiving aberrant information from different 
interview partners is founded in the relationship between the communities, the key 
respondents and the interviewer: Although the vast majority of interviewees showed 
enormous patience and enthusiasm in participating in the survey, the given information 
turned out to be not always correct. One explanation is founded in the responsibility 
the village representatives feel towards their communities: Questions regarding the 
efficiency of institutional arrangements were at the same time to a certain degree al-
ways targeting their competence as function-bearers in managing the project. Problems 
arising due to inferior institutional mechanisms sometimes seemed to be considered as 
a result of their own shortcomings, resulting in prettifying certain realities like the fi-
nancial performance. Occasionally another fact added to this phenomenon: In remote 
valleys where no AKRSP staff had been for a longer period of time, being interviewed 
by a foreigner apparently made some respondents proud. Additionally, some interview 
partners seemed to hope for the allocation of funds, although the purpose of the visit 
was always announced by the interpreters at the beginning of each interview.  
The consequence was an occasional presentation of their own achievements in a fa-
vourable light and the withholding of problems and conflicts. As a result of the cross-
checking of the information after the first round of interviews and as well as during the 
revisits, these problems could be eliminated. 
The empirical findings are presented as follows: Chapter 7 only concentrates on work-
ing micro hydels, trying to describe and analyse institutional mechanisms and their con-
tribution to the sustainability of the projects as defined in Section 3.3. While this 
analysis provides an understanding of institutional constraints imperilling the sustain-
ability of the projects, it is not possible to make statements on their actual implica-
tions. This can only be done when looking at the reasons which caused an abandonment 
of a scheme which will be done in Chapter 8. Central arguments raised in both parts of 
the chapter are illustrated by embedded boxes, presenting example substantial fea-
tures of selected projects. 
Figure 8:  
Share of Interviewed Function-
Bearers 
Source: Own field data, 2005. 
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7 Working Micro Hydels 
7.1 Attributes of the Electricity 
7.1.1 Community Electricity 
The overall basic prerequisite for motivating a community to set up institutions for the 
maintenance of a micro hydel is an equivalent benefit for its members gained through 
the electricity. Generally speaking, the question is whether “individuals [are] getting a 
reasonable and fair return on their contribution to a collective undertaking that regu-
lates behaviour?”1 
The impact of electricity from AKRSP-assisted micro hydels on the local communities 
has briefly been discussed in Section 5.3.3. However, it has to be noted that great 
variations in the availability of electricity across the different projects are prevailing: 
fewer than half of the electrified households use electric butter churners and less than 
10% use washing machines, fans, TVs or PCs. Irons, fridges and juicers can only be 
found in around 10% of the villages.2 
While most often several factors at once influence the purchase of appliances, the 
main reason for not using particular appliances goes back to the character of the elec-
tricity: As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, AKRSP hydels are not equipped with flow or load 
control governors, resulting in the risk of damage for the generator in the event of fluc-
tuating loads, which are caused by appliances like irons, washing machines and water 
heating rods, among others. Together with the overall low capacity, in around 70% of 
the projects all appliances apart from tube lights, butter churners, radio tape recorders 
and TVs are completely banned by the community. In all communities the use of wash-
ing machines is restricted to certain hours and in the vast majority of VOs/Clusters the 
use of bulbs, despite being cheaper to purchase, is banned. Only more expensive tube 
lights are allowed due to their lower demand of electricity. The reason for these meas-
ures is on the one side to prevent the generator from being damaged through fluctua-
tion loads, on the other hand to not further diminish the already modest amount of 
available electricity. In order to take care of the machine and due to the consumption 
pattern which focuses on lighting, in most villages the micro hydels operate only during 
the night time. 
In summary, two statements can be made:  
First, electricity is scarce in all communities. Therein lies an important reason for set-
ting up institutions for the sustainable use of the resource: “If resource units are rela-
tively abundant […], there are few reasons for appropriators to invest costly time and 
efforts in organising. […] Self-organisation is likely to occur only after appropriators 
observe substantial scarcity.”3 In spite of this scarcity, electricity, even if only used for 
lighting, provides the households due to various multiplier effects with enormous bene-
fits as described in Section 5.3.3.  
                                               
1 Oakerson 1992: 52. 
2 Own filed data, 2005. n = 18 communities comprising 1,933 households. The data was not gained through a 
household survey but interviews of village representatives (Section 6) responsible for charging fees for the 
use of different appliances. 
3 Ostrom 2000: 36. 
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Secondly, there are variations of available electricity between different villages. In 
some communities the micro hydels provide quite bright light and at least the possibil-
ity to use some other appliances; in others the electricity is hardly enough for dim 
light. However, the use of appliances and the resulting benefits are dependent not only 
on the available electricity. For the consumption pattern of the two communities with 
the highest and lowest ob-
served kW-per-household 
ratio, see Boxes 1 and 2. 
 
One may suppose that grea-
ter benefits due to a broa-
der spectrum of used appli-
ances results in a higher mo-
tivation to maintain a pro-
ject and therefore a de-
creased vulnerability com-
pared to installations that 
only bring light. This hypothesis could neither be approved nor rejected. On the one 
hand, a community that uses the electricity only for lighting purposes may feel less 
motivation to sustain their hydro 
power scheme due to an easier possi-
bility of substituting the electricity 
with lamps compared to a community 
that operates TVs and washing ma-
chines, which cannot be operated 
with kerosene oil. On the other hand 
it is exactly the scarcity that requires 
a high degree of self-organisation and 
the setting up of institutional rules 
(see Box 2). On basis of the collected 
data, little evidence could be found 
that micro hydels that provide rela-
tively low power are more vulnerable 
than ‘stronger’ schemes. The observa-
tions were moreover that the re-
quirements of efficient institutions for 
regulating the use of electricity often 
also come with a general high degree 
of social organisation.  
However, the transition between re-
source scarcity and a condition where “the resource is already substantially destroyed 
[and] the high costs of organizing […] [do]not generate substantial benefits”1 any more 
is often fluent. 
                                               
1 Ostrom 2000: 36. 
Box 1: Benefiting from High Capacity – VO Tar Shishi Koh 
 
VO Tar Shishi Koh comprises only 17 households that benefit 
from a 50 kW micro hydel (for the explanation of this ratio, 
refer to Box 5, p. 42). As a result of the relatively high 
capacity of the hydel, the use of bulbs is allowed and all 
households own radios, fans, butter churners and irons. 
Half of the households use the electricity for washing ma-
chines. This pattern of consumption makes it necessary to 
operate the machine around the clock, with a two hour 
break twice a week to give the machine a rest. Due to the 
good availability of fuel wood nobody makes use of electric 
heaters or water heating rods. Although the electricity 
would be more than sufficient, nobody in the village owns a 
TV or PC.    
    Interviewees: President, operator. 
Box 2: Coping with Low Capacity –  
 Cluster Drasgru Bomborate 
 
While in most of the visited micro hydels the 
capacity is enough to provide light for all con-
sumers at the same time, the extreme low ca-
pacity of the micro hydel owned by the Cluster 
‘Drasgru Bomborate’ forces the management to 
implement a quite sophisticated power man-
agement: 
Some 201 households are electrified by a 24 kW 
generator – in other words all appliances apart 
from washing machines, butter churners and 
radios are not possible to be operated or are 
banned. Although every household can install as 
many tube lights as it likes, it is only allowed to 
lighten one at a time. But even then the man-
agement has to apply load shedding, which 
means that out of the three faces, in a two-
hourly rotation only two of them are under 
power at any one time. As the capacity is not 
yet enough to run the villagers’ washing ma-
chines, the micro hydel, which generally runs 
only from 5 pm to 8 am, operates for 24 hours 
three day a week. In that case, for one day 
each, during daytime all power is given to one 
face while the remaining two are off. 
Interviewee: Manager. 
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7.1.2 Electricity by Alternative Providers 
All the arguments stated above assume that, analogous to the CBA presented in Section 
5.3.3, the only possible substitute for electricity provided by the micro hydels would be 
kerosene oil or batteries.1 While this was true in the initial stage of the programme, 
nowadays it applies only to some projects: Around one-third of the communities that 
operate micro hydels are now connected to one of the electricity providers presented 
in Section 4.5.2 In these villages a small minority of people have disconnected them-
selves from the community-owned hydel while other parts of the village use both 
sources parallel: These ‘double-connected’ households generally utilise the alternative 
electricity source but in cases of downtime they switch to the electricity of their micro 
hydel, which they normally pay regular fees for. 
The reason why both systems, community and ‘alternative’ electricity, can exist side 
by side is the distinctive advantages of each system. In spite of the different sources of 
the alternative electricity,3 the communities’ assessment of its quality compared to 
that produced themselves was quite similar: 
 
Alternative Electricity Source 
Advantage Disadvantage 
(+ Higher capacity 
(+ 24h availability 
(+ No requirement of maintenance 
(+ Possibility of illegal utilisation) 
 - Higher costs 
 
 - Unreliability 
 
 - No relaxation in case of financial 
 - difficulties 
  
 Table 1:  
 Appraisal of Alternative Electricity Sources in Comparison to Community Electricity 
 Source: Own field data, 2005.4 
 
The main advantage of ‘alternative’ electricity is its higher capacity, as there are gen-
erally no restrictions on the use of certain appliances and, in contrast to the commu-
nity-managed power, it is available throughout the day. As the ‘alternative’ electricity 
is an external utility, consumers are not obliged to contribute anything else than the 
payment, compared to a communal project where the community is responsible for the 
entire maintenance. A final advantage of electricity from non-communal sources is the 
possibility of illegal utilisation. Although this argument was (understandably) seldom 
explicitly mentioned by community members and denied by the all responsible officials, 
the fact that “due to weak grid infrastructure and substantial theft of electricity, 
losses from the transmission and distribution network totalled [in Pakistan] some 30% in 
2003/04”5 indicates at least the possibility of its validity. While manipulating the meter 
                                               
1 As the electricity is not used for heating, the availability of fire wood as an alternative energy source can 
be ignored. 
2 Own field data, 2005. n = 18. 
3 The visited communities received, if connected to an alternative provider, electricity either from the 
SHYDO hydro power plants in Reshun or Garam Chashma or from the private mini hydel in Ayun (see Figure 
4, p. 17). 
4 n = 25. The arguments are sorted according to their frequency in being quoted by the interviewed commu-
nity representatives. The argument being in brackets was seldom explicitly mentioned.  
5 AEDB & GTZ 2005: 1. 
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or bribing the meter reader seems to be less common in rural areas, in several villages 
people have given connections to their neighbours to save the connection charges. This 
does not imply that communal projects do not suffer from illegal utilisation. As we will 
see later, in that case illegality in electricity utilisation as a form of freeriding applies 
rather for banned appliances. Taking illegal connections is virtually impossible due to 
the relatively low size of community-managed projects and social control mechanisms 
within the villages. 
 
In spite of these advantages, many households in the visited villages have not taken the 
‘alternative’ electricity. While in some cases the reason is the too great distance be-
tween their houses and the grid, the electricity has a number of disadvantages on prin-
cipal.  
First of all the costs are generally higher compared to the communal electricity. Due to 
differences in the available electrical power as well as the billing system the price level 
between both community and ‘alternative’ electricity can not be easily compared, but 
the high connection charge in particular is often a (too) high financial obstacle for 
many households. An indicator for the equally high operational costs is the fact, that in 
spite of the purchasing of electric heaters and water heating rods by ‘double-
electrified’ users, these appliances are only used for a few hours a day or in the guest-
houses. No single household was found where fuel wood is no longer the major source 
of energy for cooking and heating any more.  
Apart from the high costs, the reliability of the electricity alternatives is their main 
disadvantage: “The transmission line [connecting Chitral Town to the national grid] 
remained broken through out the winter months since the time it was commissioned in 
the mid 1990s”1 and also all villages, regardless the energy provider they were con-
nected to, complained of a huge lack of reliability in the electricity supply. Apart from 
power failures lasting up to several weeks, the electricity supply is also characterised 
by regular downtimes in the range of hours. The reasons for the unreliability are apart 
from shorter downtimes due to maintenance work, the difficult terrain and the danger 
of natural hazards like landslides, mudflows, avalanches and snowstorms (Section 4.2), 
but also the “weak grid infrastructure”2 – or more precisely its limited adaptation to 
the natural conditions. Especially the steel poles often seem to be unable to withstand 
snowfall in the way the wooden poles used by communities do.  
In Section 2.2 three different business models for decentralised rural electrification 
were presented. In the context of the local conditions of Chitral in terms of reliability 
of supply, the community-based approach shows clear advantages over the public or 
private solution. This can be explained by three different facts:  
The first reason, already mentioned, is the better adaptation to local conditions of 
community projects by using local materials in the form of wooden poles. Secondly, the 
community systems are generally smaller in size. This means relatively small grids com-
pared to the private and public providers, making the system physically less vulnerable. 
                                               
1 GTZ 2005: 13. 
2 AEDB & GTZ 2005: 1. 
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Thirdly, and most important, the repair mechanisms work far better in community-
managed projects compared to public and private utilities. Without exception, all 
‘double-connected’ villages reported that in cases of breakdowns of both systems (e.g. 
as a result of snowstorms), the functionality of the community system was restored in a 
shorter time due to the collective action of the community members . 
On the one hand this can again be explained by the smaller size of the community sys-
tems, making the obtainment of information about the system’s status easier and ena-
bling a faster repair due to shorter distances. 
On the other hand the motivation and coordination of the work force is likely to be 
considerably better in community-managed projects compared to public or private 
ones. This phenomenon can be explained by the economic ‘principal-agent theory’,1 
which treats difficulties that arise under the conditions of asymmetric information 
when a principal hires an agent. According to the theory, the principal uses the agent 
to pursue his own objectives. He expects the agent to support not his own aims, but 
those of him (the principal’s). However, the principal can hardly observe the engage-
ment of the agent, who can therefore use this information asymmetry for his own ac-
tion. In the event of a damage of a private or governmental grid, the company’s man-
ager (principal) orders his employees (agents) to repair the system. Those are paid ac-
cording to the time they spend on their work, while the quality of their work (also due 
to the large distances in Chitral) is hardly (and only at great costs) to be observed by 
the employer. Therefore their motivation might differ from that of the community 
members: Principal and agent are the same persons as every electrified household at 
the same time also contributes to the maintenance work. Instead of an indirect benefit 
through a salary, the community members directly profit from their work through the 
revival of their electric supply. As they receive this benefit only in the event of success 
(reinstallation of the grid), their motivation should be considerably higher compared to 
that of the employee.  
Mentioned by quite a number of respondents was the further disadvantage that, in con-
trast to communal providers, in the event of financial difficulties no relaxation is 
granted by governmental or private providers. In comparison, communities are much 
more flexible and tolerant in dealing with financial difficulties of their members, with 
all accompanying problems (Section 7.4.3). 
 
The intervention of alternative electricity providers and the fact that both systems are 
used parallel gives rise to two possible conclusions: Under the prevailing conditions … 
(1) …electricity alternatives are a useful supplement to community-managed micro 
hydels as both systems complement each other, or… 
(2) …the availability of electrical alternatives is a major threat to the sustainability of a 
community-managed micro hydel, as sooner or later the community will give up its 
plant.To discover which of these is true, the reasons behind abandoned projects have 
to be examined, which will be done in Chapter 8.  
                                               
1 Jensen & Meckling 1976. 
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7.2 Electric Management Committee  
7.2.1 Responsibilities 
In our definition, ‘institution’ comprises the governing rules as well as the organisation 
that defines and controls them. In the context of community-managed micro hydels in 
Chitral, this organisation is the respective Electric Management Committee (EMC) of 
each village. Its members are selected by the community organisation and after the 
completion of the construction the EMC is the responsible authority for managing the 
project. In summary, the EMC has to organise the work of the employees1 and to pool 
the resources that are necessary to maintain the micro hydel and that are provided by 
the community members. These recourses are on the one hand, like in all other PPIs, 
human resources in the form of unskilled labour but on the other hand a quite consid-
erable amount of financial resources and skilled labour. These inputs are at the same 
time the demands a micro hydel system makes on a sustainable operation. 
 
Stakeholder Community Employees 
           Human Resources Inputs by Stakeholder 
(Demand of micro 
hydel system) 
Financial Resources 




- Setting of tariff system 
 
- Collection, administration 
  and utilisation of funds 
 
- Definement and realisa- 
  tion of sanctions 
- Acquisition and organisa- 
- tion of manpower 
 
- Definement and realisa- 





- Payment  
Sustainability-
Components as de-
fined in Section 3.3  
Financial Sustainability Social Sustainability Technical Sustainability 
 
Table 2: Responsibilities of Electric Management Committees 
 Source: Own presentation. 
 
 
Table 2 shows the main responsibilities of an EMC according to the inputs of the com-
munity stakeholders and the corresponding sustainability components as defined in 
Section 3.3. Regarding the responsibilities, it has to be noted that the division of re-
sponsibilities between the EMC and the remaining community members varies between 
the villages, as the latter participate in the decision-making processes to differing de-
grees. In particular, the setting of the tariff system and the selection of the employees 
is seldom solely decided by the EMC. Also other rules like the sanction systems are of-
ten fixed in so-called ‘resolutions’ in the initial stage of a project by the entire com-
munity organisation. However, a later change of the rules can quite possibly be con-
ducted without consultation of the consumers and the interpretation and realisation of 
the rules is most often solely carried out by the EMC. 
 
                                               
1 In our definition, the employees responsible for the operation the scheme are not included in the ‚Electric 
Management Committee’, yet they often also control institutional rules and are sometimes involved in the 
decision-making processes. However, as they in contrast to the members of the EMC and all other members 
of the community receive a salary, their endeavours can by definition not be considered as part of a collec-
tive action. 
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Roughly speaking, the EMC has to acquire and coordinate the resources provided by the 
community and the staff and has to define and realise penalisation measures in the 
event of freeriding. Nobody in the EMC is compensated for this effort. The total spec-
trum of responsibilities will be explicitly examined in the later outline of the study: The 
pooling of human resources provided by the community in terms of unskilled labour in 
Section 7.3, and that of skilled (operator) and unskilled (watchman) labour provided by 
the employees in Section 7.5, after the description of financial processes in Section 
7.4. An important responsibility, derived from the characteristics of micro hydel sys-
tems disregarded in Table 2 as it can hardly be assigned to the division of resources 
provided by the stakeholders, is the supervision of banned appliances, which will be 
analysed in Section 7.4.1. 
 
Before taking a closer look at the decision-making processes in the EMC, the connection 
between the stakeholders’ inputs and the already defined sustainability of the projects 
(Section 3.3) has to be established. Keeping the overlap between the three components 
in mind, the quality of what financial resources are pooled determines the financial 
sustainability of a project, the competence and motivation of the staff (or more pre-
cisely that of the operator) targets the technical sustainability, and the extent of moti-




To solve the tasks briefly described above, the members of the EMC are provided with 
different duties and responsibilities. In general, four different function-bearers can be 
distinguished, who generally hold at least one monthly meeting. The following outline 
of the function-bearers’ duties is based on the distribution of responsibilities in the 
majority of villages, keeping in mind the existence of a considerable number of differ-
ent cases. 
 
As stated in Section 5.2, the only organisational prerequisite of AKRSP for the estab-
lishment of a community organisation is the selection of a president and a manager. 
Those mostly keep their position in the EMC. 
In many villages the president is not involved in the routine day-to-day business, but 
only in special cases. His signature is necessary for making use of the Maintenance Fund 
and he is responsible for keeping records of its balance. As well as being a member of 
the EMC, he also represents the committee beyond the village. 
In most EMCs the actual head is the manager. He calls and leads the meetings of the 
committee, issues penalties against freeriders, coordinates the collection of the fees 
and pays the employees. He furthermore organises the community work as well as pos-
sible larger technical repairs on the machinery. Together with the president, he is the 
under-signer of all Maintenance Fund transactions. 
In around 50% of the EMCs another leading position exists, which has different names 
(e.g. chief executive, secretary, treasurer) as well as different functions, all related to 
the financial management of the project. While in some villages this function-bearer is 
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responsible for the management of the revenues, too, or surveys and audits the finan-
cial process, in others he only keeps the records. 
In around 75% of the EMCs the monthly fees are not collected by the heads of the com-
mittees or the employees solely. This task is taken over by members of the EMC, who 
are generally responsible for a fixed area. In monthly meetings they hand over the 
money to the manager, who then releases the salary for the employees and settles the 
expenditures for the regular maintenance. Together with the heads of the EMC, the 
members are responsible to supervise the employees as well as the use of banned ap-
pliances and to decide on sanctions.  
 
All stated positions – and this is the only common characteristic in all visited villages – 
are solely staffed by men. In contrast to this, the exact distribution of responsibilities 
varies as do the sizes of the EMC. While in some villages all responsibility lies in a few 
hands, other communities have entrusted a large group of persons with the manage-
ment of the micro hydel. As demonstrated in Figure 18, the EMCs can be clustered into 
















The first group is composed of committees that are rather personalised and only com-
prise up to four persons being responsible for managing the micro hydel; Group II inte-
grates all EMCs containing between five and 18 persons, while the third group is ex-
plained by the visit of only one outstanding community organisation, whose organisa-
tional set-up is without comparison. The management system of this village (Shagram) 
is separately described in Box 3, p. 38f. As shown in the following, each of these groups 
represents a certain type of organisation, with Shagram as a third, non-representative 
type.2 
                                               
1 n = 18. 
2 Shagram has to be treated differently from other community organisations as it has firstly by far the most 
people involved in the EMC, secondly by far the most employees and thirdly a unique billing system (Section 
7.4.1). 
Figure 9:  
Number of People  
Involved in EMCs 
Source:  
Own field data, 2005.1 
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Box 3: Sophisticated Institutional Mechanisms – Cluster Shagram 
 
Outstanding from all other visited EMCs are the institutional mechanisms in Shagram, where 
two 50 kW generators provide electricity to 340 households: 
 
 
                  Source: Own field visits, 2005. 
 
The micro hydel project in Shagram was initiated by a Cluster consisting of seven Village 
Organisations, each represented by one president and one manager. These 14 people se-
lect, or if there is no consensus, elect five member for the Board of Governors (BoG), the 
main body for managing all processes related to the hydro power project and a unique ar-
rangement in all visited projects. 
The Board of Governors, which holds weekly meetings, is lead by a president, who when 
absent is represented by his vice. He is in charge of the treasurer and the joint secretary, 
who acts for the general secretary in case of his absence. 
The treasurer is responsible for all cash transactions with the bank. Together with the gen-
eral secretary he is the signatory of the Billing Account, where all Surplus Revenues, i.e. 
the revenues after deduction of the salaries for the employees, are deposited. For expendi-
tures of the Maintenance Fund, the signature of the president is additionally necessary. All 
money transactions above Rs. 2,000 have to be permitted by all members of the BoG.  
The BoG acts as the direct employer of the staff, decides about the salaries and, if neces-
sary, hires or releases employees. The electricity fees are collected by three meter read-
ers, who also carry out measures against defaulters decided by the BoG. After not having 
paid for three months without convincing explanation, the president hands over an authori-
sation letter to the meter reader who then disconnects the respective household. 
 
The maintenance work on the channel is coordinated by the president of the BoG. He se-
lects the responsible VO(s) and informs its representatives about the requirements of la-
bour, who then select workers. People not participating in the work without reason are 
charged by their VO representatives, who hand over the money to the BoG. 
Every three months all transactions of the BoG are audited by the village representatives, 
although those often join regular meetings of the BoG, too. Once a year, all beneficiaries 
households have the possibility to check the work of the BoG, via an Audit & Advisory Coun-
cil, which is elected by vote by all households for a period of three years. Together with 
the BoG, it is the second arrangement not existing in any other village. 
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Looking at the large variance of people constituting the different types the following 
question arises: What are the characteristics of these types and what are the influenc-
ing factors for the establishment of the respective organisational structures? 
 
 
Table 3: Organisational Types 
 Source: Own field data, 2005.1 
 
Taking a look at the first characteristic listed in Table 3, the main reason for the dif-
ferent sizes of EMCs becomes obvious as Type I organisations comprise members for the 
collection of the fees only in 17% of the projects, compared to EMCs of Type II where 
this position can be found in all cases.2 A similar picture exists when looking at the fi-
nancial positions described above, which can be found in organisations of Type I with a 
probability of only 0.34 compared to EMCs of Type II where the probability is 0.91.  
Type I therefore represents organisations with lean management and seemingly rela-
tively low community participation, while Type II stands for more complex organisa-
tional systems where all four different function-bearers stated above can be found and 
which are apparently characterised by broader consumer participation in the decision-
making process.  
                                               
1 n = 18. 
2 As shown in Box 3, in Shagram paid meter readers for collecting the fees are employed, who due to their 
status of employees are not added to the EMC. 
 
Arising problems between the BoG and the community, like questions on the amount of con-
nection charges for newly-built houses or conflicts in the event of a break of the channel are 
solved by the Conciliation & Arbitration Committee. Its six members are dominate people of 
the village that act as arbitrators (Urdu: ‘salis’) in conflicts not only restricted to occur-
rences related to the hydro power project. 
 
What are the reasons that in Shagram people have developed this sophisticated and success-
ful institutional system, although AKRSP’s requisition was, as in all other projects, limited to 
the selection of a president and manager? On the one hand all factors that determine the 
organisational configurations in other hydro power projects also apply in Shagram. It is a 
Cluster level project and of all visited micro hydro power schemes, the largest in terms of 
capacity as well as in the number of electrified households. On the other hand the existence 
of a considerable number of truly dedicated and respected activists was obvious in Shagram.  
                
Interviewees: President, treasurer, general secretary, two VO managers. 
Organisational Type I II III (Shagram) 
Number of people in EMC 1-4 5-18 33 
Probability of existence of specific posi-
tions for fee collection 0.17 1 0.00 Character-
istics Probability of existence of specific posi-
tion for financial management 0.34 0.91 1 
Average number of electrified households 41 147 340 
Share of projects initiated on Cluster 




Share of projects with more than 95% 
Sunni beneficiaries 83% 0% 0% 
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As we can see in Table 3, organisations of Type I manage projects with on average 41 
benefiting households compared to an average 147 households managed by Type II or-
ganisations. This fact put the considerations about community participation into per-
spective as the relative participation in terms of the number of benefiting households 
in proportion to the number of members in EMC adapts in all Types. Furthermore it 
becomes obvious that those positions (members for fee collection, financial positions) 
differing Type I from Type II have primarily been established to cope with the demands 
of larger projects with regards to the number of households fees have to be collected 
from and the larger scale of financial transactions.  
 
An important fact when talking about community participation in the management of a 
micro hydel project is that the decision-making process is, with variations between the 
villages, seldom a democratic one. Most decisions are strongly influenced by kin rela-
tions, clan structures and power configurations (Section 4.2). “What appears as full-
scale collective action is usually reflecting inequalities in influence and power, with 
stronger families dominating.”1 That does not mean that all decisions are always made 
by the most influential members of the community having been selected at the initial 
stage of a project: As Box 4 shows, there are cases where community members are 
quite capable of changing leading positions in the event of dissatisfaction. 
 
 
A further factor that determines the characteristics of the different organisational 
types, indirectly linked to the fist argument, can be identified: Projects initiated by 
VOs have the tendency of a lower number of people being involved in the EMCs than 
projects at Cluster level, where members of each involved VO can often be found as 
representatives of their Village Organisation in the EMCs. Indeed, only 29% of the micro 
hydels managed by Type I organisations were initiated by a Cluster, compared to 70% of 
those with Type II EMCs. 
 
A final influencing factor to the organisational structure within the villages is quite 
notable. As seen in Table 3, 83% of the projects managed by less than five persons are 
characterised by electrified households of which at least 95% belong to the Sunni sect. 
Micro hydels being managed by more than seven persons always electrify communities 
with at least six percent beneficiaries belonging to other sects or religions. According 
to the denominational differentiation in Chitral, those are mainly Ismai’lis (Section 
4.2).2 
                                               
1 Wood & Shakil 2003: 19. 
2 An exception is the micro hydels of VO Jandoor Bumborate and Cluster Drasgru Bumborate with 50% and 
10% Kalasha beneficiaries, respectively. The remaining households belong to the Sunni sect. 
Box 4: Replacing the Leading Positions – Cluster Sor Laspur 
 
In order to examine the institutional processes in Sor Laspur, the EMC’s president and man-
ager were interviewed during the Mastuj Multi Stakeholder Development Forum. During the 
revisit three weeks later, the two were not in charge anymore. In a meeting of the whole 
Cluster, it was decided to replace them with two new people. The community justified this 
step with the dissatisfaction about their performance in organising repairs and checking the 
use of banned appliances. The remaining nine members of the EMC were not changed. 
 
Interviewees: Presidents, managers, two members of the EMC. 
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While the threshold value (95%) is admittedly chosen quite arbitrarily, this finding 
nonetheless demonstrates a correlation between the sectarian setting and the organisa-
tion structure. This fact can be explained as follows. Especially in the initial stage, in 
spite of its non-denominational status, AKRSP, as founded by the spiritual leader of the 
Ismai’lis and financed among others by western donors, faced considerable acceptance 
problems within the Sunni and especially Pashtun community due to the influence of 
some fundamentalist mullahs (Section 4.2). Villages with a large share of Ismai’li 
households were mostly very willing to set up VOs and later on join them to Clusters, 
compared to Sunni dominated communities where often only single families approached 
AKRSP and the formation of larger Clusters only seldom took place. The results are 
prevalently smaller micro hydro power projects in the southern, Sunni-dominated part 
of Chitral with an additional strong Pashtun influence. 
The sectarian and cultural conditions consequently firstly determine the size of the 
projects as well as the type of community organisation (VO or Cluster), which then has 
the impact outlined above on the organisational structure of the EMCs. An example of 
these religiously-motivated or at least -justified conflicts accompanying the construc-
tion of a micro hydel as well as the later development of the conflict is given in Box 5, 
p. 42. 
 
Regarding the sustainability of the micro hydels, one final question arises: What are the 
implications of the different organisational types on the sustainability of the project? 
While the answer will mainly be dependent on how the respective EMC is able to en-
force its rules and to pool the necessary resources, two statements can be made right 
now: 
First, the acceptance problems of AKRSP mentioned above have, in spite of existing 
tensions between Sunnis and Ismai’lis (Section 4.2), mostly settled down in the mean-
while, making micro hydels managed by EMC organisations of Type I therefore no more 
vulnerable per se than those of Type II organisations. 
Secondly, however, within Type I organisation systems, individual micro hydels can be 
considered as being less sustainable than others. This refers to systems where one or 
two persons are managing all processes. If responsibilities rest on many shoulders, a 
person who leaves can more easily be replaced by an already informed and familiarised 
successor than in a situation where all know-how is monopolised by one single person. 
At the same time, due to a lack of control mechanisms the danger of revenue evasion 
threatening the financial sustainability of the whole project is considerably larger in 
centralised than in diversified systems with implemented supervision mechanisms. The 
reason for the existence of such centralised systems, described in Box 6, p. 43, is often 
founded on conflicts within the community, something that is discussed in the following 
section. 
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7.2.3 Conflicts 
In many of the visited projects, tensions between community members and smouldering 
conflicts could be observed.  
As the conflicts can be founded by a mismatch of the institutional arrangements and 
the system’s characteristics and therefore be directly related to the management of 
the micro hydel, they can also be caused by anyway existing heterogeneities within the 
village. This differentiation is often not 
easy: In many cases where conflicts 
seem to be directly related to a project 
(see Box 6, p. 43), the existence of 
deeper-rooted and more complex ten-
sions and conflicts traceable to certain 
heterogeneities within the community 
and underlying the visible disputes can 
be considered to be likely. In that con-
text it has to be noted that institutional 
arrangements for managing micro hy-
dels are interrelated with other village 
institutions for regulating the utilisation 
of other resources as well as being em-
bedded into a complex social network. 
As described in Section 4.2, Chitral’s 
society is characterised by a substantial 
scope of cultural, religious and linguis-
tic diversity with quite a certain con-
flict potential. The existence of differ-
ing education levels, the belonging to 
different casts, diverse migration pat-
terns, as well as divergent extents of 
reliance on farming all add the possibil-
ity of finding a high degree of heteroge-
neity within a villages. All these hetero-
geneities provide the potential for con-
flicts within the community, which 
might also affect the sustainability of 
the micro hydel projects. 
 
 
That is the reason why “many scholars […] presume […] that homogeneity is needed to 
initiate and sustain self-governance.”1 To what extent heterogeneities finally influence 
the sustainability of community-managed micro hydels is a task this study can not 
tackle. In the period of time each village was visited it was hardly possible to observe 
                                               
1 Ostrom 2000: 44. 
Box 5:  
Electricity and Religion – VO Tar Shishi Koh 
 
When Mr. Javed Ahmad applied to AKRSP for 
the support of the construction of a micro 
hydel, all 45 households of his village were 
supporting him. They formed the Village 
Organisation ‘Tar Shishi Koh’ and everyone 
participated in the construction of the pro-
ject. When the generator was ready to be 
installed, the local mullah put pressure on 
the people not to accept the electricity and 
threatened to never visiting their houses for 
religious ceremonies any more. As a result, 
only four households completed the work and 
took benefit from the micro hydel. There-
upon parts of the other households tried, 
incited by the mullah, to sabotage the pro-
ject. The electrified members of the commu-
nity had to clean the channel during night-
times, equipped with Kalashnikovs. Neverthe-
less, it did not take long until the channel 
was destroyed and only thanks to the inter-
vention of AKRSP and the police was the 
situation finally settled.  
Now 20 households receive electricity, al-
though according to the EMC and its three 
members the remaining 25 households would 
also have the possibility to benefit from the 
hydel. However, these households are not 
living in the darkness: They receive power 
from a micro hydro project built by CADP. 
Although financed, like AKRSP, predomi-
nantly by international donors, they consider 
its electricity to be halam. Yet in comparison 
to the AKRSP Hydel, the capacity of the CADP 
one is substantial lower. As the electric wires 
of both micro hydels are fixed on the same 
poles, it was more than once that Mr. Javed 
Ahmad has discovered secretly attached con-
nections between the two wires. 
 
Interviewees: 
Manager, operator, AKRSP Area Manager Chitral 
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the large diversity of possible dimensions of heterogeneity within the communities. 
Furthermore, the effect of heterogeneity on collective action belongs to the “many 
unresolved theoretical issues [that] still exist about the self-governance of common-
pool resources.”1 For example, several villages that appeared very well organised and 
reported few problems regarding the operation and maintenance of their micro hydel 
mentioned as a reason for their success the belongingness of all members of the com-
munity to the same cast. On the other side, villages with a great heterogeneity of casts 
were not inevitably facing more problems. 
 
 
According to Ostrom (2000: 45), heterogeneity is “not a variable with a uniform effect 
on the likelihood of organising and sustaining self-governing enterprises.” The main 
question is rather, whether the members of a community “share a common understand-
ing of their situation”2 and “design institutions that cope effectively with heterogenei-
ties.”3  
This will also be the guiding principle in the following course of the study: According to 
the definition of the dimension of heterogeneity, each community is heterogeneous by 
various kinds and different degrees which all set the potential basis for possible con-
flicts. The key for a sustainable operation and maintenance of a project is however the 
establishment of institutions that function in spite of these heterogeneities and conflict 
potentials. However, micro hydel projects in communities where large-scale conflicts 
have already erupted (see Box 6) should definitely be considered as more vulnerable 
than those being managed by a community that is able to suppress conflict potentials. 
                                               
1 Ostrom 2000: 43. 
2 Ostrom 2000: 44. 
3 Ostrom 2000: 45. 
Box 6: Electricity and Personal Jealousy – VO Khoragol 
 
A well organised VO constructed its micro hydel without the occurrence of any major con-
flict; the problems within VO Khoragol started when its village Sonoghor was connected to 
the SHYDO hydel in Reshun. Out of 45 electrified households, 15 took the connection from 
this provider additionally to the community electricity. Their willingness to pay the fees 
and to contribute in the communal work faded away; finally disputes within the community 
erupted and the EMC broke off. Some of those households that receive both AKRSP as well 
as the ‘alternative’ electricity find themselves in a quandary: 
On the one hand they do not want to contribute to the continuance of the AKRSP-assisted 
hydel and support the anyway disliked operator, who additionally benefits from the elec-
tricity as he is the owner of a shop for electrical appliances. On the other hand they do not 
have the power to accomplish an universal closure of the hydro power scheme.  
Finally, they are still dependent on the community-owned micro hydel. The electricity 
from Reshun turned out to be rather unreliable with sometimes long-lasting downtimes. 
Having guests in their dark houses watching the neighbours receiving electricity from the 
community-owned project would hurt their pride. For a few of them the solution seems to 
lie in sabotaging the project. By causing faults with sitar (four-stringed Chitral instrument) 
strings, thrown over the electric wires, they try to coerce the operator to finally close the 
micro hydel. 
The operator himself is, with occasional consultation with the president, solely managing 
the whole project. As another side of the story, after deducting the expenditures for regu-
lar maintenance from the revenues, he puts all money as a salary into his own pocket. 
 
Interviewees: Operator, community member, former AKRSP Social Organisor. 
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7.3 Communal Work 
While the consumers of electricity produced by a community-managed micro hydel are 
not obliged to contribute anything more than their electricity fees to the day-to-day 
operation of the project, this changes with regard to the long-term maintenance. 
Therefore the collective work of all community members is required. This input of un-
skilled labour mainly attributes to the channel and to a minor degree to the grid net-
work. Founded by the characteristics of a micro hydel system, two means of mainte-
nance can be distinguished:1  
(1) Regular Maintenance: Regarding the channel, regular maintenance work of all com-
munity members is necessary, with different degrees of frequency between the vil-
lages. The work mainly comprises the removal of sediments from the channel that are 
brought with the river, especially in spring. The amount of time that is necessary for 
this task varies widely between different villages from one or two days per year up to 
several weeks. This variation is very much dependent on whether the water flow 
through the channel is drawn off from a river or a spring, whether the channel is ce-
mented or not, and how long the channel is. In some villages the consumers are 
furthermore required to once a year cut the branches of the trees to prevent them 
from touching the electric wires. 
(2) Emergency Maintenance: In Section 4.2 the reasons for the high risk of mountain 
hazards in Chitral were described. Those hazards also threaten the intactness of micro 
hydels and require the community to provide institutional mechanisms that guarantee 
the repair of the damages. On average, each village has an annual probability of 0.61 of 
the channel being severely damaged, causing the micro hydel to stand still for an aver-
age of eight days per year.2 The natural hazards either occur in the spring or summer in 
the form of floods, landslides or mudflows or in the winter as avalanches and 
snowstorms. The latter often additionally cause the poles to break, which then have to 
be reerected by means of the collective action of all community members. 
 
As mentioned, the duty of the Electric Management Committee is to organise the main-
tenance work as well as to enforce rules for preventing freeriding. 
Regarding the organisation in projects initiated by VOs, the coordination efforts are 
comparatively small as only relatively few households are involved in the maintenance 
process. In Cluster level projects, different types of rules for the coordination have 
emerged. The most common is that the involved VOs are obliged to provide labour for 
the regular maintenance of the whole channel in daily shifts, but also systems where 
each VO is fully responsible for a certain fixed section of the channel (whose distribu-
tion is sometimes decided by a draw) can be found. In the case of emergency mainte-
nance, generally all benefiting households have to provide labour at once. 
                                               
1 With regards to the civil engineering components and the grid network, the difference between regular 
and emergency maintenance is defined by the fact that the former is required at least once every year and 
at a foreseeable point of time. 
2 Own field data, 2005. n = 18. The calculations are based on the damage-history of the projects from Octo-
ber 2002 to November 2005. Similar to the variations in the requirements for regular maintenance work, the 
frequency of natural hazards destroying the channel varies between the different villages from once in a 
year to once every three years, causing stand-stills between a couple of days and several months.  
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In order to ensure sustainable collective action, freeriding has to be prevented. In gen-
eral each household has to send one male member to the maintenance work. To ensure 
that all households meet this obligation, a system of sanctions which comes to use in 
case of disregarding has to be developed. As Figure 10 shows, in different communities 
different penalisation systems can be found.  
In the majority of villages, a household of which no member participates in the com-
munal work has to provide refreshments to the people working on the channel. In some 
cases this penalty is due only in cases where the household does not attend the work 
without notice, in others it is obliged to contribute the fee in any case of absence. It is 
so the exact application to the indigenous mone system (Section 4.4), which is ideally 
adaptable to the new technology of micro 
hydro power, as the requirements of 
maintaining an irrigation channel hardly 





However, in 11% of the visited villages a penalty in the form of cash has to be paid.2 In 
these communities the cash penalty is a fee rather than a sanction measure. The rea-
sons are traced back to the changing socio-economic livelihoods of households in Chi-
tral. Migration to Chitral Town or downcountry is an important strategy of surviving in 
Chital, leaving female household members behind for several months. However, the 
management of (natural) resources requiring the labour in-put of the community comes 
along with the prerequisite of the availability of a certain number of (male) members. 
Therefore the changing socio-economic conditions with an increasing number of people 
working in the off-farm sector away from their villages constitute a certain threat to 
these management mechanisms. Community organisations like VO Shain Koghozi, where 
according to its manager almost 50% of the members are not working within the village, 
try to counteract this threat: If all male members of a household are working outside 
the village the households pays a certain fee as compensation. However, this system, 
even if providing an additional source of funds for the projects, is, as with other sanc-
tion systems, highly dependent on the actual enforcement of the rules. Furthermore it 
has to be noted that a lot of communities where many members are working outside 
the village have not applied this system. For instance in Paur, Gasht, or Sor Laspur, 
although being strongly affected by out-migration process, penalties in the form of re-
freshments are charged. 
                                               
1 n = 18. In many villages also a penalty in kind of ‘refreshments’ is collected in cash from what food for the 
workers is bought. ‘Cash penalty’ refers to a penalty that is not used for buying food but put into an account 
used for expenditures on the micro hydel project. 
2 See footmark 1. 
Figure 10:  
Penalisation Systems for Freeriding in 
Communal Work According to Frequency of 
Occurrence 
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If in the above two groups the penalty (either in food or cash) is not paid, many villages 
use the measure of disconnecting the respective household for a certain amount of 
time. 
 
A final group of villages finally does not apply any sanctions at all. Within this group it 
is important to differentiate: On the one hand it comprises VOs that are relatively small 
in size with all members belonging to the same cast. Due to the strong cohesion be-
tween the members, imposing sanctions is considered as being not required. On the 
other hand are villages like Khoragol, where as a result of profound conflicts sanctions 
are anyway not possible and the EMC can hardly find anyone to help maintain the chan-
nel (see Box 6, p. 43). 
 
The reflections above lead to the following key question: Are the institutional rules 
designed to mobilise communal work fitting to the requirements of the regular and 
emergency maintenance of a micro hydel and are there differences between sanctions 
according to their contribution to the (social) sustainability of the projects? Before try-
ing to answer these questions, three important statements about the sanction mecha-
nisms described above have to be made. 
Firstly, it is extremely difficult to measure the exact application of different sanctions 
between the villages. During the first interview, most communities reported quite se-
vere penalisation mechanisms, which during the revisits turned out to have often never 
been applied. This fact can have two possible if contrary explanations: Either the EMC 
is too weak to implement the sanctions, or the high quality of collective action does 
not require any in the first place. 
Secondly, these sanction mechanisms are unlikely to be implemented in all cases and to 
all members equally. For instance in some villages a small number of households are 
free from any contribution to the maintenance work, either because its members are 
too old or the household is female-headed. Furthermore, during the revisits of the pro-
jects it came to light that in the majority of villages freeriders exist that never take 
part in the communal work and that also never pay any penalty. Those are mostly per-
sons who are respected due to their religious or social status within the community. 
While the members of the EMC often complain about this behaviour on the quiet, no-
body has yet had the courage to take action against it.  
Thirdly, the selection of a certain sanction mechanism, regardless of when and to what  
extent it is applied, is always influenced by several factors. An influencing factor is on 
the one hand the physical setting of the project (e.g. the general risk of natural haz-
ards and the physical vulnerability of the project deduced for instance from the length 
of the channel), and on the other hand also the social setting (e.g. the size, heteroge-
neity and socio-economic background of the community). 
 
Based on these three findings, the conclusion about the effectiveness of certain sanc-
tions can be drawn that apparently no one particular sanction mechanisms is superior 
to another, as its selection is largely dependent on the circumstances of the whole pro-
ject. Furthermore, the actual enforcement of the rules by a respected EMC seems to be 
considerably more important for the success of collective action than the mere exis-
tence of a certain penalty. 
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Regarding the general effectiveness of the community-designed institutions to pool 
human resources, it can be said that these are generally working quite well. Of course, 
in many villages freeriding occurs in spite of the institutions but as it takes place only 
on a relatively small scale and as it is tolerated by the remaining households it does not 
imperil the sustainability of the projects. Apart from villages where general conflicts 
threaten the entire project, the institutions for mobilising communal work are there-
fore working quite well. One might argue that the efficiency of communal work as an 
element of collective action necessary for sustaining a micro hydel project is, in com-
parison to financial mechanisms for example, more difficult to be operationalised and 
measured. To some extent this is true; on the other side also those interviewees freely 
admitting problems regarding the financial system or conflicts within the community 
stated that in comparison to all problems they face, the mobilisation of the communal 
work functions quite well. Even through deeper questioning about the history of break-
downs, very few delays came to light that would indicate time lags as a result of a slow 
and difficult mobilisation process. Furthermore, after the impact of natural hazards the 
functionality of community-managed electricity systems turned out to be restored con-
siderably faster than those of other providers (Section 7.1.2). 
 
One reason for the relatively successful institutional mechanisms for ensuring commu-
nal work is explained by the fact that the demand for collective action for managing 
natural resource systems has always been an important aspect of Chitral’s society (Sec-
tion 4.4). In many ways the requirements in terms of labour input resemble those for 
irrigation systems maintained by communities in almost all parts of Chitral. To some 
extent, changing socio-economic conditions are challenging these collective mainte-
nance systems; nevertheless, some villages have tried to implement countermeasures. 
However, if more and more people elect the way to pay a fee instead of contributing 
labour to a project, two possible scenarios arise: Either the system will still be collec-
tively managed with the difference that the inputs provided by the community are sub-
stituted (capital against labour) according to the individual availability and that addi-
tional paid staff are possibly employed for the work. Or the people contributing labour 
will start using the fees as their own wage while the remaining households will gradu-
ally be relieved from responsibilities and as well as their right to say, eroding the con-
cept of collective action and moving towards a market-based solution. 





6% Pure flat rate
22%
Flat rate plus 
fees for add. 
tube lights
44%
7.4 Financial Mechanisms 
7.4.1 Billing Policy 
Apart from the characteristic of a micro hydel that it has to be maintained by means of 
human resources, the system furthermore requires a considerable amount of financial 
resources which the community members have to afford. A major part of the money is 
collected through electricity fees, which are mainly used for paying the wages of the 
staff as well as for expenditures on the regular maintenance of the machinery. While 
the exact utilisation of the funds provided by the community will be discussed in detail 
in the following two sections, the fee-collection systems in the different villages can be 
differentiated into four different billing policies: 
As can be seen in Figure 11, 
in only 6% of the micro hydel 
projects are the fees 
charged according to the 
actual consumption by using 
meters. Only the community 
in Shagram (see Box 3, p. 
38f) decided, advised by 
AKRSP, to buy and install 
meters. All other communi-
ties are using different kinds 
of billing policies. The most 
common practice is to 
charge a flat rate for every 
household irrespective of 
the number of tube lights 
used by the household (‘pure 
flat rate’) or with extra charges for additional lights above a certain threshold of tube 
lights already included in the flat rate. In 28% of the projects the monthly fee is calcu-
lated by multiplying the number of used lights with a certain fee. As can be seen, the 
main element of most billing systems is the number of tube lights a household uses. 
While lighting is still the most important utilisation in many villages, other electrical 
appliances are also used (Section 7.1.1). Although most villages established in the ini-
tial stage of the project a catalogue of monthly fees for each electrical device, there 
are actually, apart from TVs in some villages, generally no charges for other appli-
ances. 
 
The amount of the flat rate, the number of tube lights included in it as well as the fees 
for (additional) tube lights vary significantly across different projects. Figure 12 pro-
vides an overview of the theoretic monthly fees households with different numbers of 
tube lights (up to four) have to pay as well as the mean monthly fee charged across all 
                                               
1 n = 18. 
Figure 11:  
Different Billing Systems According to Frequency of 
Occurrence 
Source: Own field data, 2005.1 
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AKRSP-assisted micro hydel projects. As can be seen, there is a considerable variation 
in the costs for each tube light. A factor that influences this pattern is the size of the 
projects which causes households of very small projects to pay higher prices to enable 
the accumulation of a sufficient amount of revenues to pay the staff. For each differ-
ent number of tube lights (1-4), among the four most expensive communities are three 
VOs where less than 50 household are electrified. In Tar Shihi Koh, with only 17 electri-
fied households, a monthly flat rate of Rs. 100 (approx. € 1.39) is charged, which ap-
proaches a monthly fee that could be expected from a private or public provider. How-
ever, the amount of electricity provided by this community-managed micro hydel is 















 Figure 12: Monthly Electricity Fees for Different Numbers of Tube Lights 
   Source: Own field data, 2005.1 
 
In addition to the connection for households, many villages also provide electricity to 
shops, which are generally charged via a special flat rate. The few consumers using the 
electricity in a productive way are most often charged different, but mostly with 
slightly higher tariffs. Mosques, jamaat-khanas,2 schools and police stations are gener-
ally free from any charge. 
Figure 12 suggests that there is a certain increase in the mean monthly fee charge 
across the different projects from Rs. 27 for one tube light to Rs. 38 for four. However, 
after checking the financial records every EMC keeps, it became obvious that often only 
few households of a village are actually paying different fees from the average. The 
reason is that only a few households charged with a ‘flat rate plus additional tube 
lights’ billing system excel the number of tube lights already included in the flat rate. 
Together with the fact that additional charges for other appliances could, with the 
occasional exception of TVs, not be enforced by the EMCs in the majority of villages, in 
                                               
1 n = 17. The figure does not include fees charged by using electricity meters. The mean monthly fee was 
calculated by dividing the accumulated fees charged for a certain number of tube lights in the different 
communities through the number of communities, irrespective of the number of paying households. 
2 A jamaat-khana is a place of prayer for Ismai’lis. 
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most communities the actual billing policy is a flat rate for most consumers, not re-
sembling the actual consumption of electricity. 
This billing policy has three important consequences: 
 
(1) In contrast to a per-unit billing system, there is little incentive for saving energy. 
Tube lights are generally never switched off, further diminishing the already scarce 
electricity.  
 
(2) In many cases there is no redistribution between wealthier households having more 
rooms and tube lights as well as using electrical appliances like radios, washing ma-
chines and electric butter churners compared to relatively poor households with one or 
two tube lights and no additional electric appliances. However, this argument has to be 
put into perspective as in every village a substantial number of ultra-poor households 
(up to 15% of the total number of electrified households) is free from any cost. While 
this fact shows the establishment of an institutional arrangement that anticipates and 
ex ante prevents freeriding, it furthermore demonstrates the strong cohesion within a 
community. 
 
(3) As already mentioned several times, due to the low capacity of the micro hydels 
and the prerequisite of keeping the load on the generator as constant as possible, the 
use of certain appliances is often forbidden. In regard to a flat rate billing policy, the 
ability of the EMCs to control such bans is more than questionable as the use of these 
appliances, although being forbidden, is without any additional cost for the user. While 
by being charged according to the consumption by means of meters, the illegal use of 
for instance an iron would mean extra costs for a household, the inducement not to use 
it is relatively low under the current billing policy.  
The effect of a low incentive for reciprocity is reinforced by the difficulty of obtaining 
information about freeriding due to two reasons: 
(a) As we have seen in Section 7.1.2, around one-third of the villages with AKRSP-
assisted micro hydels are now also connected to an alternative provider and parts of 
these villages use both sources of electricity in parallel. In most villages these ‘double-
electrified’ households are not able to use both sources at the same time. Due to the 
lower capacity of the communal electricity, households, depending on the village, rela-
tively seldom switch to it to save the meter-measured fees of the ‘alternative’ electric-
ity, as the light is dimmer and, for example, heating water would take far longer. The 
main problem starts during downtimes of the alternative provider. Due to that higher 
capacity, the ‘double-electrified’ households own all the appliances that are banned 
for the use with the micro hydels. Compared to ‘single-electrified’ households for 
whom the possession of these appliances is generally forbidden, they have the right to 
own them. As information about the (long-term) ownership of an appliance is more 
easily obtainable than about the (short-term) utilisation, villages that are electrified by 
two providers face exceptional problems in regulating the use of banned appliances. 
The EMC of Cluster Chinar has in response developed an interesting countermeasure, 
presented in Box 7. 
(b) As learned from the analysis of impact studies of micro hydels in Chitral, the main 
beneficiaries of electricity are women (Section 5.3.3). Butter churners, washing ma-
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chines and especially the often banned appliances irons and water heating rods are 
mainly used solely by women. However, of all visited communities, in no EMC (totally 
comprising 163 people) is one single woman a member. Under the condition of a broad 
observation of purda, the fact that men try to control the utilisation of certain appli-
ances used by the women of other households does not appear to be an effective 
mechanism. The scope of this problem may vary with the size of the villages as well as 
the relations between the households and the denominational setting. 
 
By concluding the statements made above, it becomes obvious that the current billing 
policies are with the exception of meters quite problematic. While the prevalent sys-
tems have the advantage that no meters have to be installed, they offer no incentive to 
obey the restrictions on certain appliances. Their users – analogous to Hardin’s herds-
man – gain the benefit from the appliances while all others have to bear the costs in 
terms of a lower capacity and an increased risk for the generator. The institutions regu-
lating this behaviour have to cope with difficulties in obtaining information due to 
technical and religious restrictions. 
 
 
To cope with this situation in the short term, a vigilant operator (Section 7.5) who pre-
vents the generator from burning through is necessary; in the long term, and especially 
for new micro hydro power projects, meters should be installed. Some community or-
ganisations meanwhile have concrete plans to install meters or have already started to 
collect money. 
 
7.4.2 Financial Complexity 
In most villages the monthly electricity fees are collected by the members of the EMC, 
in some, mainly those managed by Type I EMCs, this job is carried out by the operator, 
in others the community members themselves have to come to the house of the man-
ager to deliver the money. In all communities managed by organisations of Type II (and 
Box 7: Coping with the Illegal Utilisation of Banned Appliances – Cluster Chinar 
 
The general existing problem of the utilisation of banned appliances is increased in Chinar, 
where out of 142 electrified households, 45 additionally receive electricity from SHYDO. 
These households use water heating rods, irons and heaters, appliances whose utilisation is 
strictly forbidden on the communal electricity. While the ‘double-electrified’ households 
can not use both kinds of electricity at the same time, some of them occasionally switch to 
the community one, in order to save the (meter-measured) fees for the SHYDO electricity. 
In the event of its downtime everyone uses the electricity produced by the micro hydel. In 
order to impede the ‘double-connected’ households from powering their appliances with 
the communal electricity and thus preventing the generator from burning through a fourth 
time as well as to keep the available amount of electricity at an acceptable level, the EMC 
has developed a well-thought out mechanism:  
The grid of the micro hydel is divided into three faces, each electrifying different areas of 
the village. By observing the voltage and frequency meters, the operator in the power-
house can detect a misuse and assign it to one of the three faces. In this case he is advised 
to switch the face off and instantly on for three times. This signal is on the one hand a 
warning to the misuser that he has been detected. On the other hand the members of the 
community living in the affected part of the village are alert and leave their houses to 
detect the freerider. 
 
Interviewees: President, manager, chief executive, operator. 
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y = 16.33x + 1147.6
R2 = 0.6919
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III), the EMC meets on a certain day per month where all members hand in the col-
lected money. These funds are required for three kinds of expenditures:1 
(1) Salaries: Each community employs at least one person for the operation of the mi-
cro hydel. As this assignment is a full-time job he receives a monthly salary. Depending 
on the number of employees and their wages, a village has to provide between Rs. 750 
and Rs. 9,000 in funds every month.2 
(2) Regular Maintenance: As shown in Chapter 2, the maintenance of the electro-
mechanical equipment needs a considerable amount of funds for purchasing, among 
others, grease, belts and bearings. With considerable variations between different vil-
lages, a community has to spend on average around Rs. 540 per month,2 dependent 
among other things on the age of the equipment and quality of the construction. 
(3) Emergency Maintenance: In the event of a breakdown of the micro hydel, financial 
reserves need to be available to afford the necessary repairs, especially for the electri-
cal and mechanical equipment. In more than 20% of the villages a major breakdown of 
the electro-mechanical equipment happens at least once a year. Half of the break-
downs in the last three years were caused by a burn-through of the generator, which is 
responsible for almost two-thirds of all electro-mechanical breakdowns.3 Keeping the 
variations between the villages in mind, each community spends on average an addi-
tional amount of Rs. 3,500 per year on emergency maintenance.1 
 
In order to bear these three sources of expenditures, in principal each community 
member has to contribute financial resources in two ways: 
(1) Every household has to afford the monthly electricity fees, which represent the 
Monthly Revenues of the project:  
Figure 13:  
Collected Monthly (Surplus) Revenues Dependent on the Number of Electrified Households 
Source: Own field data, 2005.4 
                                               
1 In regard to the electro-mechanical equipment, the difference between regular and emergency mainte-
nance is defined by the fact that the former is practicable during daytime without interrupting the night-
time energy supply. 
2 Own field data, 2005. n = 18. 
3 n = 18. The calculations are based on the damage-history of the projects from October 2002 to November 
2005. 
4 n = 16. The revenues are equivalent to the monthly accumulated average fees actually collected by the 
EMCs, not the expected ones (see Figure 15, p. 56). For VO Khandari and Cluster Deh Brep no reliable and 
consistent data was available. 
Rs. 
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Although we have seen that households in very small villages often have to pay a higher 
price for the electricity, Figure 13 illustrates that there exits a correlation between the 
total amount of monthly collected revenues and the number of electrified households. 
This correlation diminished when looking at the Surplus Revenues, namely the revenues 
after deducting the expenditure for salaries and regular maintenance. A coefficient of 
determination (R2) of 0.1093 indicated that other factors determine the Surplus Reve-
nues. However, it has to be noted that the Surplus Revenues themselves reflect the 
financial profitability of a project only to a limited degree. Firstly, electricity fees are 
not the only source of income; secondly, in the Surplus Revenues the expenditures for 
emergency maintenance are not yet included. These are however subject to immense 
fluctuations, requiring the search for another quantity for the financial success of mi-
cro hydel projects. 
(2) Apart from the monthly electricity fees, in the initial stage each household has to 
pay a connection charge (between Rs. 500 and 1,000) which will provide the basis for 















                                  
 Figure 14: Exemplary Financial Mechanisms in Community-Managed Micro Hydels 
  Source: Own presentation. 
 
As shown in Figure 14, in an example village the revenues collected through the fees 
are put into a billing account from which the salaries and the expenditures on regular 
maintenance are paid. The remaining Surplus Revenues are deposited into the Mainte-
nance Fund, which is used in the event of emergency maintenance. According to that 
model, the development of the Maintenance Fund would represent the financial success 
of the project as its increase would be the result of incomes excelling the expendi-
tures. However, on the ground this model experiences grave modifications in every 
village, complicating any statement about the financial success of different projects: 
• In spite of the conditions of the ToP, 22% of the villages have not established a 
Maintenance Fund.1 The reason will be explained in Section 7.4.4. 
                                               
1 Own field data, 2005. n = 18. 
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• In many villages the expenditures for regular maintenance are not bore by the 
Maintenance Fund but by direct cash contributions from the households (Section 
7.4.4).  
• Several villages keep no bank account at all. In these villages (mainly managed by 
Type I EMCs), one person keeps all money in cash.  
• In some villages the funds placed in the Maintenance Fund are fixed for a certain 
amount of time, enabling growths due to interest. 
• In communities where both accounts have been established, the frequency of de-
positing revenues into the Billing Account or Surplus Revenues into the Maintenance 
Fund varies from once in a month via once Surplus Revenues are available to never. 
• While in some projects all consumers pay the connection charge prior to the start 
of the construction, in many others instalments are still going on years after the 
completion of the project, making a comparison of the development of the Mainte-
nance Fund between different villages futile.  
• As seen in Section 7.3, some EMCs charge cash penalties for not participating in 
communal work. This type of penalty is sometimes also charged against misusers of 
banned appliances and defaulters, providing an additional source of income. 
These distinctions in the financial mechanisms between different communities led to 
the insight that while a decrease in the Maintenance Fund indicates low financial prof-
itability, (due to insufficient revenues or major expenditures) the reverse can not be 
drawn: An increase of the Maintenance Fund is not an indicator of high Surplus Reve-
nues. The additional fact that the quality of the financial records varies considerably 
between different villages made it necessary to conduct a thorough survey of the fi-
nancial mechanisms of every village. 
 
7.4.3 Financial Profitability 
By analysing and comparing the various financial systems in the different villages, it 
came to light that no single community was found where the accumulated funds com-
prising a Maintenance Fund and/or a Billing Account grew without the addition of later 
added connection charges or through interest. No community is making any significant 
profit from their micro hydel projects.1 They are able to finance the expenditures for 
operation and regular maintenance mostly through revenues, but sometimes also by 
using cash penalties and connection charges. In contrast, emergency expenditures are 
seldom paid from revenues, but from one-time charges of the households, either 
through connection charges (Maintenance Fund) or through ad hoc levies (Section 
7.4.4).  
 
Furthermore, and most importantly, the communities do not pool enough financial re-
sources for covering the depreciation on the equipment.2 For the non-existing financial 
profitability of the projects, two explanations are possible: (1) Either the majority of 
                                               
1 This result corresponds with an evaluation conducted by the World Bank (2002: 111) that states that “cost 
recovery is just sufficient to cover routine O[peration] & M[aintenance].” 
2 This section only focuses on the income regularly deriving from the projects as a result of the communi-
ties’ established institutional arrangements. Maintenance Funds, as they are a prerequisite for obtaining a 
project, are not taken into account. 
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benefiting households are not provided with sufficient financial resources to afford 
higher electricity fees or (2) the communities are not willing to pay higher prices and 
the EMCs are not able to get them passed. 
 
(1) On the one hand the community members may not be able to cover higher fees. 
With variations between villages and households this may be true to some extent; on 
the other hand one has to take the actual opportunity costs into account. The CBAs, 
illustrated in summary in Figure 6, p. 24, were calculated on prices from the year 2000. 
Due to the increase of fossil fuel prices this situation has changed dramatically: At the 
time of the field visits the price of one litre of kerosene oil in Chitral was Rs. 45 com-
pared to Rs. 13 in 2000.1 Using a carefully estimated monthly consumption of 10 litres 
per household,2 a family would have to spend on average Rs. 450 per month for lighting 
their house. By comparing this figure with an average monthly electricity fee of Rs. 38 
for four tube lights (see Figure 12, p. 49) the large amount of saved money becomes 
obvious, particularly as in this sample calculation opportunity costs through saved ex-
penditures on batteries have not been taken into consideration, let alone the various 
non-monetary benefits of electricity. The argument that a number of households hesi-
tate to take a connection of an alternative provider due to the higher costs seems to be 
more likely rooted in the high connection charge than in the amount of the monthly 
fees. However, these reflections do not suggest that the majority of households would 
actually be capable of bearing higher costs, especially as the productive use of the 
electricity is more than limited. Without differentiated data about the actual (cash) 
income situation, no well-founded statement can be made if, where, and to what ex-
tent an increase of electricity fees up to a profitable level would be possible.  
 
(2) The figures used in Figure 13, p. 52 represent the average monthly revenues the 
communities stated they collect. By checking them with the information given by the 
interviewees about the billing system, the actual revenues turned out to be considera-
bly less than the expected ones. The reason for these differences is manifested in the 
sometimes large amount of outstanding debts, listed for each project in Figure 15.  
On the one hand this figure shows the existence of big outstanding debts in several 
villages. The ‘front runner’ in terms of total debts as well as regarding the dues per 
households is Mastuj. On average, in this Cluster every household has a debt of Rs. 380 
with an electricity fee of Rs. 10 per tube light; the total outstanding debts amount to 
Rs. 65,000. Taking the fact in consideration that the EMC averagely collects Rs. 6,200 
per month, it means that the total revenues of the whole village for several months are 
missing. As seen in Figure 26, this situation is not an isolated case but can be found in 
quite a considerable number of the micro hydel projects. The fact that all these 
communities obviously face a problem in recovering the existing fees questions the 
realisability of even higher prices for the electricity. 
                                               
1 Own field data, 2005, AKRSP 2000: 11. Included in this price hike is a general rise in price level amounting 
27% from 2000 to 2005 (own calculation, based on the Consumer Price Indices of GoP 2006a: 119). 
2 According to various impact studies, prior to the construction of a micro hydel in different villages, be-
tween 9 (Effendi 2000a), 14 (AKRSP 2000), 15 (Effendi 2000c) and 27 (Effendi 2000b) litres of kerosene oil 
per month and household were consumed. In our calculation the demand for kerosene is assumed to be 
perfectly inelastic. 
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On the other hand the figure does however also indicate that by far not all communities 
have problems in recovering the electricity fees: In an approximately equal number of 
villages no household (HH) has got dues. 
 
Figure 15: Outstanding Debts 
 Source: Own field data, 2005. 
 
The question itself suggests why in some communities the institution for acquiring fi-
nancial resources in the form of electricity fees seems to work quite well, whereas in 
others apparently a large number of freeriders exit. This study can not provide an ex-
planation applying to all communities, but some tendencies can be identified: 
 
In many communities with large outstanding debts, this fact was often justified by the 
respondents with the effects of migration. The women of a household who are left be-
hind for several months by the male members of the family for working in downcountry 
do generally not pay the fees until the return of the men. As the case for the supervi-
sion of restrictions on electrical appliances, the involvement of women would, apart 
from representing an enhanced empowerment in general, possibly solve this problem. 
However, this explanation does not explain the cleared outstanding debts in villages, 
also strongly affected by out-migration processes. 
 
Some theorists would suppose that large amounts of dues as an outcome of shortcom-
ings in institutional arrangements for enabling collective action (payment) would more 
probably be found in large villages than in smaller ones. This argument is based on Ol-
son’s (1965) work, who argues that the size of a group is negatively related to solving 
collective action problems. Figure 15 shows the outstanding debts of communities 
which are sorted according to the number of electrified households and, as can easily 
be observed, such a supposed correlation does not exist. While on the one hand there 
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more reluctant to pay their fees due to an increased non-committal, on the other hand 
village representatives in many small communities reported that due to the close kin 
relationships it is hard for them to push their relatives to pay the fees. In any case, 
regarding the prevalent study, the size of the group does not have a uniform effect on 
the quality of the collective action. 
 
In order to prevent freeriding in terms of defaulting, every community has developed 
its own system of sanctions, mostly including the elements of late fees and then dis-
connection. As for the different penalisation systems implemented to ensure communal 
work (Section 7.3), equal problems also apply in the context of billing.1 In general, the 
strict implementation by the EMC seems to be more effective than the sole existence of 
a sanctions system (see 
Box 8). One explanation 
for low dues therefore 
applying in at least 
some villages, is the 
existence of a firm and 
respected EMC. On the 
one hand it prevents the 
occurrence of large-scale freeriding which has the effect that at some point in time, 
almost nobody is paying anymore (see Box 11, p. 69). On the other hand it stops the 
amount of dues for each household exceeding an amount that the household is not able 
to clear any more. In Mastuj, people fulfilling their payment obligations are now only 
able to pay back parts of their dues. 
 
In summary, no factor that influences the dues that applies to all villages can be identi-
fied; however, it has to be noted that also villages suffering from low payment morality 
have so far managed to finance all expenses. Nevertheless, their problems in recover-
ing the fees makes the claiming of higher charges, which would then cover the depre-
ciation of the installation, rather unrealistic. In this context it should be remembered 
that communities with no outstanding debts also pool too few financial resources in the 
long term. 
 
One reason for the relatively too low charges (and also a further explanation for high 
dues) is the effect that paying electricity fees is, from a short-term perspective, only 
to some extent necessary for keeping the project running: The staff need to be paid on 
a monthly basis, whereas the remaining expenditures can under good circumstances be 
relatively low for a certain amount of time. While an input of human resources is espe-
cially in case of emergency maintenance easily communicable, as the effect of this 
endeavour is immediately visible, regularly paying electricity fees is, apart from the 
fund for the staff and the expenses for regular maintenance, an insurance against fu-
ture emergencies, which occurrence is uncertain and unpredictable. While this situa-
                                               
1 Comparable to the sanction policies which should ensure communal work, some sanctions (late fees), 
although included in the resolution passed by the communities in the initial stage of the projects, are rarely 
realized in any project. Furthermore in most communities there a limited number of freeriders exist, in the 
sense that these people have never paid any fee.  
Box 8: Clearing Outstanding Debts – Cluster Sor Laspur 
 
Prior to the change of the president and the manager of the 
Electric Management Committee in Sor Laspur (see Box 4, p. 
40), the total dues of all community members exceeded Rs. 
28,000. The first step of the newly selected function-bearers 
was to collect all outstanding debts, resulting in almost 
cleared dues. 
 
Interviewees: President (new), manager (new), community member. 
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tion still challenges the recovery of fees in many villages, charging even higher fees for 
creating a fund for the replacement of the existing machinery appears improbable.  
Linked to this argument is the fact that providing labour to sustain a resource system is 
deeply rooted in indigenous institutions for resource management, compared to a sce-
nario with obliged regular cash payments for replacing costly technical parts of a pro-
ject after the end of their lifetimes. Already in the existing situation, many village rep-
resentatives stated considerable problems in convincing the community members that 
although all of them have worked in the construction of the hydel, and although the 
village is now the owner of the project, they still have to pay monthly fees.  
These arguments are ideally illustrated by the example of VO Khandari, which is out-
lined in Box 9, where the ‘new’ mechanism of charging electricity fees exists side by 




One last, and probably the most important, reason that the communities charge insuf-
ficient fees for replacing larger parts of the installation is the fact that the communi-
ties have up until now relied on the support of AKRSP. By having a ‘backup solution’ for 
the replacement of large parts of the project, EMCs have little incentive for pushing 
high fees, that will possibly never be required.1 
 
In our definition, a financially sustainable micro hydro power project would require the 
managing community to possess “enough funding for the operation and the mainte-
nance of the micro hydel.”2 This definition is deliberately vague. Assuming an endless 
time horizon, financial sustainability would require the project to pool enough funds 
derived from its benefits (electricity) to sustain it after the end of its lifetime. Using 
this definition and disregarding one-time charges for a Maintenance Fund, none of the 
micro hydels is financially sustainable. Assuming however the time horizon to finish 
with the end of the project’s lifetime, all visited micro hydels that are running sustain-
ably. The assessment of different gradations of sustainability requires – due to the 
complexity and diversity of different financial systems – an in-depth study of each pro-
                                               
1 To what extent AKRSP’s financial injections may with regard to a mainly as well subsidized electricity 
supply by alternative providers be appropriate will not be further discussed within this study. 
2 Section 3.3. 
Box 9: Financing the Operation and Maintenance of a Micro Hydel – VO Khandari 
 
In VO Khandari, the contribution of the 29 electrified households to the operation and main-
tenance of their micro hydel occurs, apart from the collaboration in communal work, in two 
ways: In order to compensate the operator for his duty, every household is obliged to hand 
him over 20 kg of maize every year. For covering the expenditures for regular maintenance 
on the machinery, every household has furthermore to pay electricity fees of Rs. 6 per tube 
light and month. At the time of the visits (November 2005) with the exception of two house-
holds all community members had delivered the maize. Regarding the money, in 2005 with 
few exceptions so far no household has paid any fee. In 2004 only half of the households had 
paid the electricity charges. 
In Spring 2003 the generator broke, causing a financial damage of Rs. 6,500. At that time the 
operator, who is solely managing all financial processes, had Rs. 3,000 of revenues in his 
hand. As the community has no Maintenance Fund, the remaining money was lent from a 
man within the village. It took almost one year to collect enough fees to pay off the credit. 
 
Interviewees: Manager, operator, two community members. 
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ject. The crucial point in any case is that in the event of damage to the machinery, the 
community is provided with sufficient funds for financing the repair process. Therefore 
the communities are obliged to establish a Maintenance Fund. How the communities 
who have not installed such a fund do cope with the challenge of suddenly occurring 
high costs will be outlined in the next section. 
 
7.4.4 Maintenance Fund 
Although included in the ToP, in 22% of the villages no Maintenance Fund was estab-
lished.1 Figure 16 illustrates the different amounts of Maintenance Funds, as well as the 
denominational differentiation in Chitral. To illustrate the connections it also includes 
projects that are now abandoned. 
Figure 16: Maintenance Funds of Sampled Micro Hydel Projects 
 Source: Own presentation. 
 
The figure can of course be challenged as the denominational differentiation at Tehsil-
level is too rough and the concentration on the Sunni sect presents a simplification of a 
more complex context as ethnic-linguistic facts, for example, are disregarded. How-
ever, the figure clearly indicates a correlation between areas with a high Sunni share 
and whether a Maintenance Fund has been established or not. All communities without 
a Maintenance Fund are located in tehsils with a Sunni share of more than 75%. Apart 
from the two visited micro hydels managed by Kalasha people, no project in Chitral and 
Drosh was found with a Maintenance Fund. One reason for this correspondence is the 
                                               
1 Own field data, 2005. n = 18. 
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already mentioned fact of acceptance problems of AKRSP by many Sunni- and Pashtun-
dominated villages. In order to establish a relationship with these villages, which often 
opposed AKRSP, and to connect them with the outside world through electricity-
powered telecommunication appliances, concessions on the condition of the ToP were 
made and from the obligation to establish a Maintenance Fund, demanding a relatively 
large payment of each household, was dissociated. The fact that saving is a religious 
legitimated objective for Ismai’lis1 added to the easier promotion of Maintenance Funds 
in their villages. 
 
As can also be seen from Figure 16, the amount of Maintenance Funds varies considera-
bly. However, as shown in the previous section, without analysing the whole financial 
system of each community, the size of the Maintenance Fund says little about the fi-
nancial profitability of the projects. Furthermore it has to be noted that its establish-
ment and also its initial size was required by, and negotiated with, AKRSP as a prereq-
uisite for obtaining the project. In contrast to the other financial mechanisms, it is 
therefore not a community-made institutional arrangement. 
 
What is then the impact of a Maintenance Fund on the financial sustainability of the 
projects? It is obvious that communities having established a large Maintenance Fund 
have advantages: In the event of a larger repair, funding is readily available and in 
some isolated cases the Maintenance Fund is even enough for a future replacement of 
electro-mechanical parts. However, judging these projects financially more sustainable 
than those with no Maintenance Fund, would require the latter to evidently face more 
problems in financing repairs. This assumption could not be approved. The reason is 
that communities with no Maintenance Fund have different characteristics to the other 
villages. As stated above, the existence of a Maintenance Fund is strongly influenced by 
the denominational setting. Section 7.2.2 showed that this fact also indirectly influ-
ences the size of the projects, as religious motivated tensions and reservations against 
AKRSP have hindered the motivation and cooperation of communities for obtaining lar-






As shown in Table 4, communities having installed a Maintenance Fund electrify on av-
erage 150 households, whereas those without the fund comprise on average 32 house-
hold.3 In correlation to the findings of Section 7.2.2, communities without Maintenance 
Funds are always managed by Type I EMCs, compared to those without a Maintenance 
                                               
1 Schönherr 1992: 29f.  
2 n = 18. 
3 All sampled projects without Maintenance Funds electrify fewer households than those with Maintenance 
Funds. 
Establishment of Maintenance Fund No Yes 
Average no. of electrified 
households  32 150 Character-
istics 
Probability of being managed 
by EMC of Type I 1 0.07 
Table 4:  
Community Characteristics 
Dependent on the Existence 
of a Maintenance Fund 
Source: Own field data, 2005.2 






Surplus Revenue / Billing Account 
Ad hoc levy
 
Fund, which predominantly have Type II EMCs. In the event of an emergency, the re-
quired money is either taken as a credit and paid back later on (see Box 9, p. 58) or 
collected through ad hoc levies. In that case only in very rare situations does every 
household pay the same amount of money; instead the people contribute according to 
their financial capacity. In the visited communities, these procedure have so far 
worked quite well, due to relatively small numbers of electrified households and there-
fore relatively low organisational efforts. Apart from time lags between the occurrence 
of the damage and the allocation of funds, micro hydels managed by communities with 
no Maintenance Fund can on the basis of the collected empirical data not be considered 
being financially less sustainable per se than projects where such fund exits, due to 
their special conditions.  
This result is strengthened by the findings presented in Figure 17. One might suppose 
that communities with a Maintenance Fund rely on this kind of funding in the event of 
emergency maintenance. However, this applies only to around three-quarters of the 
expenditures. These have indeed been financed by making use of the Maintenance Fund 
or the Surplus Revenues, or, in cases where the money has not yet been deposited into 
the Maintenance Fund, the Billing Account. But in spite of the existence of a Mainte-
nance Fund, around one-quarter of all expenditures for major repairs of the scheme is 
financed by ad hoc levies of all electrified households. In none of these cases was the 
balance of the Maintenance Fund too low to bear the costs. Reasons given by the mem-
bers of the EMCs for this procedure were the following: In many cases of ad hoc levies, 
the damaged occurred to the channel and the community argued that they want to use 
the Maintenance Fund only in regard to the electro-mechanical equipment. Some vil-
lage representatives argued furthermore that they want to save the funds in the Main-
tenance Fund. The argument often went into the direction of keeping a saving for lar-
ger damages, but some people also stated that by means of a high Maintenances Fund 











This finding shows that the externally implemented institutional 
arrangement of establishing a Maintenance Fund is in many cases not a decisive factor 
for the sustainability of the micro hydel.  
                                               
1 n = 14. The figure is based on all expenditures for emergency maintenance in the different micro hydel 
projects from October 2002 to November 2005.   
 
Figure 17:  
Source of Money for 
Expenditures on 
Emergency Mainte-




Own field data, 2005.1  
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7.5 Operation 
In every community a certain number of people are employed by the EMC. In general, 
these male employees that are selected by the community or the EMC can be divided 
into four categories with regard to their duties: 
(1) Operator: Every village employs one operator. As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, he 
received training from AKRSP and is now responsible for all technical processes, which 
includes the supervision of the machinery during the operation, the realisation of regu-
lar maintenance works and the connection of newly electrified households. In many 
villages with Type I EMCs he is furthermore often involved in the fee collection or is 
even solely responsible for all financial processes. On average, an operator earns Rs. 
1,400 per month, varying between the villages from Rs. 400 to Rs. 2,500.1 
(2) Watchman: Some 60% of the VOs/Clusters employ a watchman (Urdu: ‘chowkidar’). 
In the remaining 40% his duties are additionally fulfilled by the operator. While the 
operators’ job is related to the electro-mechanical parts of the scheme, the watch-
men’s responsibility is, analogous to the indigenous mirzhoi system (Section 4.4), the 
channel. Daily he has to observe the channel to remove obstacles as well as to detect 
possible breaks. The watchman furthermore has to clean to forebay tank and release 
the water into the penstock pipe. In some villages it is necessary that the watchman 
together with the operator prevents the channel from freezing during the winter. 
Watchmen have an average monthly salary of Rs. 1,100.2 
(3) Lineman: A minority of villages with a relatively large number of households addi-
tionally employ a lineman for maintaining the transmission lines and providing electri-
cal connections. 
(4) Meter Readers are only found in villages using meters (Shagram), where they are 
responsible for collecting the fees. 
As linemen and meter readers are relatively rare positions in the projects, the follow-
ing text will concentrate on operators and watchmen only. 
As stated in the pervious parts of the study, the vigilance of the operator is of crucial 
importance in the AKRSP-assisted hydro power projects. Due to the non-existence of 
flow or load control governors, the operator has to control the flow of the water manu-
ally to keep the generator’s speed constant. His permanent observation of the fre-
quency and voltage meters is especially important as, due to a non-consumption-based 
billing policy, the compliance with restrictions on appliances that are energy-hungry 
and characterised by shifting electricity demands is not encouraged and the bans are 
difficult to be effectively controlled (Section 7.4.1). The operator is therefore obliged 
to remain the whole night inside the powerhouse, checking the meters on the panel 
board, the intensity of the lights and the sound of the machine to be able to immedi-
ately adjust the flow of water. However, as seen in Section 7.4.2, burn-outs of genera-
tors represent with almost two-thirds the largest share to all breakdowns of the elec-
tro-mechanical equipment. According to the AKRSP engineers, the vast majority of 
                                               
1 Own filed data, 2005. n = 18. 
2 Own field data, 2005. n = 12. 
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Watchman
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these repairs could be avoided by a careful supervision of the system by the operators.1 
This statement was confirmed by several village representatives, who claimed the op-
erator was responsible for damages to the generator as he was not present in the pow-
erhouse at the time of a breakdown. Especially in villages with large distances between 
the houses of the community members and the powerhouse, the supervision of the op-
erator is difficult.  
A similar situation applies to watchmen. Hindering a channel from breaking requires its 
continuous supervision by the watchman. However, in several villages they were ac-
cused of being responsible for breaks due to their carelessness. 
The general satisfaction of members of the EMC with the performance of the staff is 
illustrated in Figure 18. We see that the members of the EMCs are generally more satis-
fied with the work of the operators, whose performance in almost one-quarter of the 













 Figure 18:  
 Assessment by Function-Bearers of the EMCs of Their Staff’s Performance  
 Source: Own field data, 2005.2 
 
However, it is also evident that in almost one quarter of the projects the EMCs claimes 
the staff’s performance is ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’. This raises the question if in these vil-
lage measures are taken to change the situation and possibly sack staff. 
To answer this question, an important finding of this study has to be included. When 
asking about the reasons that led to the selection of a particular person for the job, the 
following fact come to light: As shown in Figure 19, in around three-quarters of all 
cases the operator was employed because he is the owner of the site where the power-
house is constructed and the watchman obtained his job due to owning the land that 
the micro hydel channel is flowing through. 
This procedure can be explained as follows: In the majority of cases where the land 
owner does not donate his land for the project or where it is not in possession of the 
                                               
1 Interview Mr. Babar, AKRSP Micro Hydel Engineer, November 2005.  
2 n = 17. The assessments were conducted by all interviewed function-bearers of the EMCs. It has to be 
noted that in villages where only one person was interviewed the assessment represents a single opinion 
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Other
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community,1 the landowner is compensated by the community through an ‘employment 
contract’. 
On the one hand this procedure has some advantages. With regards to the operator it is 
ensured that he often lives close to the powerhouse; with regards to the watchman the 
advantage can be seen in the fact that in the event of a break in the channel it is first 













  Figure 19: Decisive Reasons for Staff’s Employment  
    Source: Own field data, 2005.2 
 
On the other hand however, this institutional arrangement brings a grave potential 
problem. All staff that have property rights on the project have a monopoly on its posi-
tion. Although around one quarter of the operators and watchmen perform their duty in 
an unsatisfactory way in the eyes of the EMC, they yet can not be sacked as they claim 
their jobs as a compensation for their land. Therein raises the situation that in villages 
where the staff have no property rights related to the scheme, in almost every second 
case it has been changed by the community due to dissatisfaction, compared to the 
remaining 75% of communities where with one exception (resignation) a change in staff 
has never happened.3 Several community organisations (e.g. Riri, Shain Koghozi, Chi-
nar) are in the dilemma that the employees’ performance is very poor and the EMC is 
not able to sack them as wanted. In these communities, discussions and negotiations 
are focused on collecting money so that the community can buy the land and end the 
monopoly situation of the staff.  
                                               
1 About 95% of all households in Chitral own their land. Pastures are mostly owned by the village, with each 
households having grazing rights (GTZ 2005: 25). 
2 n = 18. 
3 Own field data, 2005. n = 18. 
Operator Watchman 
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7.6 Synopsis 
In the first part of the empirical part of the study, the different institutional mecha-
nisms applied in community-managed micro hydels were analysed with regard to their 
contribution to the projects’ sustainability. The basic prerequisite for establishing 
these mechanisms is the electricity provided by the hydro power scheme. The benefit 
of electricity is valued very highly by the consumers although, with variations between 
the villages, it is characterised by a considerable scarcity, requiring rules that govern 
its use. Unless the resource base is substantially destroyed, no empirical evidence was 
found that relatively low per household electric capacity comes with a decreased social 
sustainability derived from reduced motivation to maintain the project. Whether this 
statement also applies to communities that are additionally connected to an alterna-
tive electricity provider will be outlined in the next chapter. In these projects, house-
holds use both sources of electricity parallel as those have complementary characteris-
tics. Comparing the reliability of both types of providers, it becomes obvious that 
community-managed projects have clear potential advantages compared to private or 
state-run approaches. 
 
The organisations in communal micro hydel projects in Chitral that define and control 
the rules necessary for sustaining the projects are the Electric Management Committees 
(EMCs). With varying degrees of community involvement, the main responsibilities of 
the EMCs are the acquisition, pooling and coordination of resources provided by the 
community and the employees, as well as the supervision of institutionalised rules. 
According to the number of people involved in the committees, the EMCs can be classi-
fied into two groups, each representing an organisational type with different character-
istics. However, the division does not reflect different degrees of community participa-
tion in the decision-making process; instead the two types are determined by commu-
nity characteristics, including the denominational setting. Therefore no organisational 
type can be judged of having an evident impact on the sustainability of a project, with 
the exception of centralised systems involving one or two persons only. These are often 
a result of conflicts, either founded by institutional shortcomings or by heterogeneities 
within the village. While this study could not prove heterogeneity on its own to have a 
uniform effect on the quality of community institutions and therefore on the sustain-
ability of the micro hydels, already erupted conflicts have to be regarded as a major 
risk factor. 
 
In all visited projects the consumers have to contribute their labour to the maintenance 
of the hydels. To ensure this form of collective action, the communities have devel-
oped several coordination structures and different penalisations systems. The latter are 
with certain digressions also applied to ensure payment morality and the compliance 
with restrictions on electrical consumption patterns. However, with regards to the sus-
tainability of the projects, the strict application of the different sanction systems by a 
respected EMC seems to be more decisive than their mere existence. With the excep-
tion of general conflicts threatening the entire project, the institutional mechanisms 
for communal work are functioning quite well, resulting in a general high social sus-
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tainability. Arguments can be found in the fact that communal work is deeply rooted in 
indigenous resource management systems as well as in the fact that the success of 
communal work is immediately visible. Nevertheless, changing socio-economic condi-
tions may imperil the collective management mechanisms. 
 
Apart from manpower, the households are obliged to pay monthly electricity bills. The 
most commonly applied billing systems are flat rates, with often no extra charges for 
additional appliances. According to CPR theory, difficulties in the utilisation of a com-
mon-pool resource arise due a mismatch of the resource’s characteristics and the insti-
tutions that govern its use. With regards to the community-managed micro hydels, the 
billing policy presents an indisputable mismatch. The micro hydels are characterised by 
low intensity of electricity and a lack of flow and load control governors, which are 
required for keeping the generators’ speed at a constant level. A billing policy of flat 
rates however provides little incentive for saving electricity and obeying bans on for-
bidden appliances. This mismatch between the technical characteristics of the resource 
and the governing rules is widened even further by religious and cultural constraints 
hindering an improved supervision of banned appliances through women as well as by a 
situation where households receiving electricity from two providers can evade the re-
strictions. The result is a further decrease of available electricity and the requirement 
of a vigilant and motivated operator. A recruitment policy however that brings along a 
monopoly position for the staff leads to further risks of generators burn-outs. 
 
Regarding the price of energy, in very small projects the people have to bear higher 
costs for the electricity; nevertheless, the amount of total collected revenues rises 
with the number of electrified households. However, the sizes of the projects have 
neither a uniform effect on the profitability nor on the payment morality. Taking the 
great diversity of financial mechanisms in different projects into account, the commu-
nities have not established institutions to pool enough financial resources for covering 
the depreciation of the equipment. The reasons may lie in lacking financial capacities 
of the majority of households, which in comparison to the opportunity costs of electric-
ity seems to be a questionable suggestion. On the contrary, large amounts of debts 
resulting from migration patterns, an inconsequent enforcement of sanctions, difficul-
ties in communicating the necessity of regular fees for creating reserves, and the avail-
ability of external financial injections, rather generally question the possibility of fi-
nancial profitability in community-managed projects. From this point of view, no micro 
hydel is financially sustainable. However, by focusing on the given projects’ lifetimes, 
the fact that all communities have somehow managed to pool enough financial re-
sources to conduct all repairs twists this assumption round. The externally imple-
mented institutional arrangement of collecting connection charges for a Maintenance 
Fund facilitates the funding of breakdowns, although it is in many cases not a deciding 
factor for sustaining a project. 
 
Issues regarding the final impact of the problems outlined above, that are most often 
derived from a mismatch between the characteristics and demands of micro hydels and 
the institutional arrangements, on the sustainability of projects resulting in the aban-
donment of a scheme, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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8 Abandoned Micro Hydels 
The fact that approximately 20% of all AKRSP-assisted micro hydels in Chitral are not 
in operation anymore1 raises questions about the reasons and the fundamental differ-
ences between them and those plants that are still used by the communities. Compar-
ing abandoned micro hydels with those that are in operation, it is noticeable that the 
projects in both groups resemble each other very much. 
 
Condition of Micro Hydel In Operation Abandoned 
Average no. of electrified households 101 93 
Probability of being managed  
by Type I EMC 0.33 0.33 
Average performance of staff 
(1-very poor, …, 5-very good) 3.48 3.85 
Probability of at least one employee 









Probability of establishment of  
Maintenance Fund 0.78 0.29 
 
 Table 5:  
 Selection of Characteristics of Operating and Abandoned Micro Hydel Projects 
 Source: Own field data, 2005.2 
 
These features for instance involve (as shown in Table 5) the number of electrified 
households, the organisational type, the performance of the staff and their property 
rights, which show no statistical significant differences between working and aban-
doned projects.3 Furthermore, in both groups religious motivated conflicts occasionally 
characterise(d) the initial stage of the projects, both report problems in controlling 
restrictions on consumption patterns, both sometimes have (/had) a small number of 
permanent and tolerated freeriders within their villages, in both groups there exist(ed) 
cases with problematic bill recovering and in both burn-outs of the generator are 
(/were) not uncommon. 
The only, if weak, statistically significant difference between both groups is the exis-
tence of a Maintenance Fund,4 with abandoned projects less likely to have established 
one.5 During the analysis of micro hydels in operation, it was stated that the establish-
ment of a Maintenance Fund is in many cases not of crucial importance, proved by the 
fact that a considerable number of small communities have been managing the hydro 
power plant successfully without having the fund and also those with it often use other 
sources of funds. This statement is not challenged by the quantitative findings above, 
as by analysing the qualitative information about the reasons that led to the abandon-
                                               
1 Own estimation. 
2 n = 27. The performance of the staff is calculated on the basis of the assessments of function-bearers of 
the EMC, (see footmark 2, p. 63) only taking operators and watchmen into account. 
3 The described variables differ between working and abandoned projects with significant levels (asymptotic 
2-tailed significance in Pearson’s chi-square test) of more than 0.288. 
4 Additionally financial features can not be compared as in many abandoned projects, due to the long period 
of time passed, no reliable information was obtainable. 
5 Abandoned and working micro hydels differ in the existence of a Maintenance Fund at a significance level 
(asymptotic 2-tailed significance in Pearson’s chi-square test) of 0.083. 
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ment it is found that the existence of this fund would not have prevented the micro 
hydel from being abandoned in any community. 
The main reasons named by the communities that led to the abandonment, the analysis 
of the lifespan of the projects and the availability of ‘alternative’ electricity are sum-
marised in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6: Lifelines of Abandoned Micro Hydels 
 Source: Own field data, 2005.1 
 
In spite of the similarities between working and abandoned micro hydels, one feature 
differentiates both groups significantly and that is the existence of external factors 
most often either through natural hazards (1) or derived from the availability of ‘alter-
native’ electricity (2). 
 
(1) As we have seen in the previous part of the study, micro hydels in Chitral are 
strongly physically vulnerable to natural hazards destroying the channel and the grid. 
But as shown in Section 4.2, water is a major risk factor in another way too, making 
droughts a serious problem in Chitral. Almost half of the abandoned micro hydels vis-
ited were affected by long-lasting severe water shortages in a way that, in the end, 
electricity was only available by load shedding, if at all. 
As stated in Section 7.1.1, the transition from resource scarcity to a situation where 
the resource base is substantially destroyed is fluent. In this case, for example due to a 
drought, the light is getting dimmer and dimmer and the benefits for the households 
diminish, resulting in a deceased willingness to bear the costs for self-organising. De-
pending on the strength of the institution within the village, either the community will 
                                               
1 The lifelines of the availability of ‘alternative’ electricity only take the connection into consideration; 
downtimes are not considered. 
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use the micro hydel for a period of time and then commonly agree to stop the opera-
tion as it is not feasible any more, or conflicts will arise. 
 
(2) However, as can be seen in Table 6, linked to the occurrence of droughts is often 
the availability of ‘alternative’ electricity. While around one-third of the communities 
operating a micro hydel are connected to another provider, in almost all abandoned 
projects electricity is available. Taking a look at the lifetimes in connection with the 
availability of ‘alternative’ electricity, the projects can be divided into the four groups 
(a) to (d). 
 
(a) The VO in the first group is the only vis-
ited project where the community members 
are now living in the darkness; thereby the 
intervention of an alternative electricity sup-
plier was not involved in the process of aban-
donment. The same applies for droughts; 
however, another external factor caused the 
abandonment – namely the non-repairable 
destruction of the channel during a road con-
struction (see Box 10). 
(b) The second group comprises communities that are now electrified by alternative 
providers. However, as the villages had to live in darkness for a certain amount of time 
the electricity alternatives did not play a role in the abandonment. The reason for 
stopping the operation of the hydro power schemes was a severe shortage of water, 
making lighting without additionally using kerosene impossible. The existence of gen-
eral conflicts, whose impact on the sustainability of the projects has already been iden-
tified in Section 7.2.3, further facilitated the decision to close the micro hydel. 
(c) In the third group, the abandonment of the community-managed micro hydro power 
plants directly passed into an electric connection from other providers. Like in the pre-
vious group, the projects were heavily affected by droughts diminishing the benefits, 
and/or by general conflicts increasing the costs for self-organising. Nevertheless, in 
Box 10: 
Improving a Road and Destroying the 
Channel – VO Bioli Payeen 
 
When the Government improved and 
widened the road in Bioli Payeen, the 
channel was damaged in way which 
makes it – according to the village 
representatives – impossible to be re-
paired. The community was compen-
sated for the destruction and now 
waits for the electrification by SHYDO, 
who has already erected the poles. 
 
Interviewees:  
Manager, operator, member of EMC. 
Box 11: Conflicts and the Coming up of a Way Out – VO Tink Kuruayun 
 
After the completion of the micro hydel in 1995, the management of the project worked 
quite well for the next five years: People paid their bills regularly and no larger repairs 
were necessary. In 1999 a major conflict within the village arose: On the one side the two 
households that own the land of the powerhouse and the channel which they had provided 
the community without compensation and on the other side the manager and other mem-
bers of the EMC. The exact reasons of the conflict, which had the result that people even 
today do not talk with each other could not be clarified as both interviewed conflict parties 
had their own version of the story. The result of the conflict, derived from personal jeal-
ousies and inter-cast tensions, was that the management of the micro hydel changed and 
from 1999 on the two households with the property rights managed all affairs. Their per-
formance can be seen in the amount of debts. At the time of the change they had Rs. 
3,600; two years later the total outstanding debts of the consumer excelled Rs. 22,000. 
Fewer and fewer people paid their bills, also because the construction of the private mini 
hydro power plant in Ayun was in progress. When the community was electrified by that 
electricity, people did not hesitate to close their hydel. 
 
Interviewees: Manager, landowner, operator, member of EMC. 
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contrast to the previous group, the relation between cost and benefits seemed to be 
worthwhile for the communities to operate the project. However, at the point of time 
an exit option for this unfavourable ratio was available in the form of electricity supply 
of an external provider, the community commonly opted for it and ended the project. 
Noticeable is the case of VO Prayet Payeen, as its micro hydel was abandoned after 
having been operated for just three months. This case impressively demonstrates an 
unfavourable allocation of resources derived from a lack of coordination and dialogue 
between the different actors in the energy sector of Chitral, outlined in Section 4.5. 
(d) The last group comprises communities that used the micro hydel electricity parallel 
with that of other providers for a certain amount of time until the VO/Cluster finally 
decided to stop the operation of the scheme. These communities have therefore been 
in a comparable situation that around 30% of the working projects are currently in, 
namely the simultaneous availability of electricity from the community-managed micro 
hydels and from other providers (Section 7.1.2). Figure 20 compares the ratios of ‘sin-
gle- and ‘double-connected’ users in working and abandoned micro hydro power pro-




Figure 20: Sampled ‘Double-Connected’ Community Organisations 
 Source: Own presentation. 
 
As seen from Figure 20, in all abandoned projects at the time of abandonment more 
households were using two sources of electricity compared to those relying on the com-
munal micro hydel. In all working projects ‘double-electrified’ households are in a mi-
nority, with the exception of Cluster Murdan, where the ‘alternative’ electricity is 
characterised by an extraordinary level of unreliability.1 This finding does not suggest 
that a majority of households that receive electricity from two providers is necessary to 
shut down a micro hydel, as the facts presented above (group (c)) have indicated that 
micro hydro power plants are also abandoned by communities when alternatives are 
only in sight. However, in cases where the micro hydro electricity is, either due its high 
                                               
1 Two-thirds of the micro hydel electricity consumers in Murdan are additionally connected to the hydro 
power scheme in Garam Chashma (see Figure 4, p. 17), which in 2005 provided electricity for less than 
three weeks (Own field data, 2005; Interviewees: President, manager, secretary, member of EMC). 
WORKING MICRO HYDELS 
 71 
power or the alternative’s low quality, a true alternative, a majority of double-
electrified households seems to be necessary for the abandonment.  
 
Thereby the question raised at the end of the Section 7.1.2 about the impact of elec-
tricity alternatives on the sustainability of the projects can be answered. In the major-
ity of visited communities the availability of electricity alternatives was the main rea-
son that led to the abandonment. Unless the majority of households decide to keep the 
micro hydel as the only source of electricity, the project will be given up.  
Projects that are ‘double-electrified’ are thereby especially vulnerable. Further exter-
nal factors like natural hazards in the form of droughts destroying the resource base 
and diminishing the benefits deriving from the projects will cause more and more peo-
ple to opt for additionally supplies. At a certain point of time the costly maintenance 
of regulating institutions will not be supported by the majority of consumers and the 
whole project will be stopped.  
 
The consequence is that the respective communities have to cope with the unreliability 
of the ‘alternative’ supply.  
 
 
VO Pari Mali has tried to cope with this dilemma by declaring their micro hydro power 
installation a ‘spare hydel’, which means that it will only be brought into operation in 
cases of longer downtimes of the alternative provider (see Box 12). Nevertheless, this 
example demonstrates that while the latter strategy can work quite well under ‘normal 
conditions’, in case a major input from the community is required to preserve the 
standby mode of the ‘spare hydel’, the community is not easily motivated, especially if 
the ‘alternative’ electricity has been relatively constant recently. Therefore the suc-
cess of the intention of VO Rayeen Muzdoor, which is planning the same, should not be 
regarded too optimistically in the long term: Taking the micro hydel into operation, 
finding a temporarily operator and charging consumers is more easily organised than 
long-lasting repairs in anticipation of a possible future requirement. 
 
Concluding the observations of abandoned micro hydels, it becomes obvious that in the 
end no project was given up without the intervention of an external electricity provider 
or other effects from outside, either in the form of droughts or human impacts both 
taking away the possibility of generating a sufficient amount of electricity. 
Box 12: Abandonment in Stages – VO Pari Mali 
 
In November 2003, VO Pari Mali was connected to the SHYDO hydro power plant in Reshun 
and the majority of the community members took a connection. Both systems were used 
parallel until November 2004, when the VO finally decided to close the micro hydel and use 
it as a ‘spare’ plant. In April 2005, a downtime lasting one month prompted the community 
to again take the micro hydel into operation and bridge the power failure. After the electric-
ity supply from SHYDO was reinstalled, in July 2005, a flood destroyed the channel of the 
once-again not operating micro hydel. As at this moment no direct dependency on the pro-
ject existed, the repair of the channel – which would last several weeks – was not taken up. 
During the next power failure the community will therefore not be able to fall back on their 
micro hydel. 




By applying Hardin’s thesis to community-managed micro hydels, rural decentralised 
electrification by means of collective action would fail in the long term as consumers 
would act selfishly and not jointly operate and maintain the system in a sustainable 
manner. As seen in the case of hydro power projects in Chitral, communities however 
are able to set up institutions that govern the use and ensure the maintenance of the 
plants and that in many ways function better than state- or private-based models. How-
ever, all projects suffer from similar problems, derived from a mismatch between the 
institutions and the characteristics and demands of the system. The billing policies sel-
dom differentiate between different levels of electricity consumption, which results 
together with other reasons in poor control mechanisms of banned appliances, the pro-
ject are running unprofitably with too little revenue generated to cover the deprecia-
tion and the personnel employment processes are problematic as they often prevent the 
communities from sacking staff. 
However, by analysing the reasons that lead to the abandonment of projects, it be-
comes obvious that the accruing of external factors like natural hazards destroying the 
complete resource base or exit-options through electricity supplies from alternative 
providers are necessary for a community to shut down the project. The fact that the 
problems outlined above are on their own not enough to imperil the sustainability of the 
projects shows the success of the programme and proves that decentralised rural elec-
trification by means of collective action is a worthwhile and feasible approach. 
 
Community-managed micro hydel projects in Chitral can roughly be clustered into two 
types. Type I represents relatively small projects, managed by a few people, not having 
established a Maintenance Fund, and mostly located in Sunni-dominated areas. Type II 
projects have a larger share of other denominations, a relatively high number of electri-
fied households, more sophisticated rules and organisation structures, higher revenues 
and a Maintenance Fund. Nevertheless, as seen in many examples, within these groups a 
wide variation of institutions exits. These institutions were established to govern the use 
of the micro hydels as appropriate to their characteristics.  
As stated in the Oakerson framework, this refers to the technical and physical nature of 
the micro hydels. Different installations differ in terms of the available electricity, the 
quality of the construction, the equipment’s age, the risk of natural hazards, the size of 
the scheme in terms of the length of the channel and the extent of the grid, the quality 
and quantity of the water, the used equipment and its age and many others factors. All 
these factors have different impacts in influencing the benefit the community gains 
from the projects as well as the costs it has to bear for the operation and maintenance. 
However, a project is not only characterised by differing technical and physical attrib-
utes, it is furthermore embedded into a unique social setting. Differences in the number 
of electrified households, distinctive religious and ethnic-linguistic settings, different 
numbers of clans with varying relationships, socio-economic heterogeneities, personal 
jealousies and conflict potentials make different demands on the regulating institutions. 
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As the institutions are set up by the community to cope with the demands of the pro-
jects, the variation in communal and physical characteristics is reflected in the variation 
of institutions.  
Thereby emerges an important consequence for future attempts at decentralised rural 
electrification by means of collective action. In spite of the shortcomings outlined 
above, it is of essential importance to enable communities to set up their own institu-
tions instead of imposing external blueprints of how the project should be managed. 
Uniform institutional instructions would not match to the varying characteristics of the 
project and therefore barely be accepted by the communities. 
However, this is only one side of the coin. Successful decentralised electrification by 
means of collective action is not only about allowing communities to set up their own 
institutions, it is furthermore about enabling them to do so. This requires three condi-
tions: 
Firstly, the communities need to take ownership of the projects even before construc-
tion by involving them in the planning process, by precisely imparting the exact divisions 
of responsibilities and by demanding their contribution to the construction. 
Secondly it means scaling down the technology of hydro power to a level that villages 
can deal with, by using locally manufactured parts, establishing repair facilities and 
providing thorough and repeated trainings but also through regular consultation and 
technical support. 
Finally, enabling villages to establish institutions requires endeavours for guarding the 
community institutions from imperilling external factors occurring from either natural 
hazards destroying the resource base or exit-options resulting from the connection to 
alternative providers. Solutions can on the one hand be provided by comprehensive 
technical feasibility surveys, on the other hand seen through an improved communica-
tion with other actors in the energy sector and the seeking of an integrated energy pol-
icy for rural development at the regional and national level. 
In compliance with these prerequisites, the approach of decentralised rural electrifica-
tion by means of collective action can make a considerable contribution to solving the 
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